Vulnerability and augmentation of power grids: a complex network approach by Wang, J
  
Vulnerability and Augmentation of Power Grids: A Complex Network Approach 
 
 A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
 
 
Bachelor of Engineering (Electrical Engineering) RMIT University, Australia 
 
 
 
 
School of Engineering 
 College of Science, Engineering and Health 
RMIT University 
 
September 2018 
 
 
 
Declaration of Authorship
I, Jinjian Wang, declare that this thesis titled, ‘Vulnerability and Augmentation of
Power Grids: A Complex Network approach’ and the work presented in it are
my own. I confirm that:
 This work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research degree
at this University.
 Where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any
other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been clearly
stated.
 Where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly at-
tributed.
 Where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With
the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work.
 I have acknowledged all main sources of help.
 Where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have made
clear exactly what was done by others and what I have contributed myself.
I acknowledge the support I have received for my research through the provision of an
Australian Government Research Training Program Scholarship.
I certify that except where due acknowledgement has been made, the work is that of the
author alone; the work has not been submitted previously, in whole or in part, to qualify
for any other academic award; the content of the thesis is the result of work which has
been carried out since the official commencement date of the approved research program;
any editorial work, paid or unpaid, carried out by a third party is acknowledged; and,
ethics procedures and guidelines have been followed.
Jinjian Wang
February 2019
i
“Death gotta be easy cos life is hard.” – 50 Cent
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Abstract
Vulnerability assessment of power system networks is becoming an essential re-
quirement for minimizing the risk of disastrous power outage events especially
while power networks are constantly growing in size and complexity due to the
increasing power demands and low-carbon mission agreement all over the world.
This thesis is dedicated to study the vulnerability and augmentation of power
grids with complex network approach. The work in this thesis can be broadly
categorised into three parts: vulnerability analysis, network augmentation and
vulnerability analysis of growing power networks.
First of all, two vulnerability indices are introduced. A novel maximum flow
based centrality index is proposed which treats a power system as two complex
networks: real power flow network and reactive power flow network. Both real and
reactive power are important in maintaining the robustness of the network. Two
vulnerability indices (real power flow centrality index and reactive power flow cen-
trality index) are proposed which represent the vulnerability level in two different
networks. Two centrality indices are combined using fuzzy logic to generate the
system composite centrality index. The analysis is carried out on the IEEE 14 bus
system. Second, complex network based hybrid approach is proposed which take
time varying net-ability ratio as a centrality index to assess vulnerable components
in a modern power network while considering the intermittent and unpredictable
characteristic of renewable generation. To demonstrate the applicability of the
proposed method, three case studies are performed on IEEE 14 and IEEE 30 bus-
es power structures utilising both simulation data and real data. The simulation
results verify the effectiveness of the method to identify the critical transmission
lines in a modern power grid.
xiii
Abstract xiv
Secondly, while modern networks constantly change in size, few studies have sought
methods for the difficult task of optimising this growth. Here works of this the-
sis study theoretical requirements for augmenting networks by adding source or
sink nodes, without requiring additional driver-nodes to accommodate the change
i.e., conserving structural controllability. The method determines the minimum
number of nodes augmentable to arbitrary networks in parallel. Our ”effective aug-
mentation” algorithm takes advantage of clusters intrinsic to the network topology,
and permits rapidly and efficient augmentation of a large number of nodes in one
time-step. ”Effective augmentation” is shown to work successfully on a wide range
of model and real networks. The method has numerous applications (e.g. study of
biological, social, power and technological networks) and potentially of significant
practical and economic value.
Finally, IEEE 118 bus and South-East Australia power networks are applied to
investigate the feasibility of the proposed vulnerability analysis and network aug-
mentation methods. First the power system complex network model is proposed.
Then, with proposed vulnerability analysis method, vulnerable lines are identified.
The simulation result shows that adding additional lines accordingly could poten-
tially enhance the system robustness. Finally, effective augmentation method is
feasible of maintaining the structural controllability of the network without re-
quiring additional driver-nodes to accommodate the change.
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
This chapter provides an overall background to the project and motivation of
the research. Section 1.2 provides a overview of power systems. In the section
the power network topology including power grid complex model and cascading
failure are explained. Section 1.3 provides a overview of complex network theory.
Section 1.4 discusses the motivation for this research and defines the scope for the
study. Further, in section 1.5, the objective and contribution of this research are
outlined. The final section concludes the structure of the thesis.
1.2 Power System
Power systems, as one of the most important infrastructures, play an indispensable
role in the modern society. The size of these systems including different compo-
nents and different types of interactions among them has grown dramatically to
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Figure 1.1: General layout of electricity grid.
meet the increasing power demand. A power networks is acknowledged as a com-
plex network not only because of its huge sizes of components but also the complex
interactions among them.
1.2.1 General concepts of power network
A typical electrical grid consists of generating stations that produce electricity,
high voltage transmission line that carry power from distant places to demand
centres, and distribution lines that supplies the power to individual customer. To
reduce the power loss and increasing the efficiency, the electricity is stepped up to
high transmission voltage level via step-up transformers before delivering though
the networks. On arrival at a substation, the power will be stepped down to a
distribution voltage level and stepped down further at customer side. The general
layout of electricity grid is shown in Fig 1.1. To keep the system stable and reliable,
the voltage levels and frequency across the network should be maintained in a safe
range.
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1.2.2 Vulnerability of power grids
In power networks, ”robustness” or ”vulnerability” (its opposite concept) are often
used to measure to what extent a power grid has high reliability or low reliability
respectively when a disruptive event emerges. Vulnerability analysis identifies the
vulnerable components of a power grid, such that monitoring or protection of these
components could potentially improve network security, robustness and reduce the
risk of cascading failure. There are many examples of power network black out
due to failure of vulnerable components, such as the European black out on 2006.
1.3 Complex Networks
The study of complex network has become a popular topic of interdisciplinary
research in the twenty-first century. A network is a set of elements which consisting
of vertices or nodes and connection between them, called edges or links, as shown
in Fig 1.2. Undoubtedly, many systems in nature can be described as complex
networks. Examples are numerous. The social network is a network of people.
The internet is a network of routers or domains. The citation network is a network
of paper or publications. The brain is a network of neurons. The power network
is a network of substations, bus bars and loads; the nodes are connected via
transmission, distribution lines.
In different complex networks, the concept of ”complexity” may refer to a quality
of the system or to a quantitative characterisation of that system [1, 2]. In the
first meaning, the complexity refers to the presence of emergent properties due
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Figure 1.2: Example of a small network.
to the appearance of multiple interactions over time. The second meaning relates
complexity to the amount of information needed to describe the system.
The study of networks, in the form of mathematical graph theory is one of the
fundamental pillars of discrete mathematics. The first proof of emergence of Com-
plex Network Theory (CNT) can track back to 1736, when Swiss mathematician
Leonhard Euler solved the Konigsberg bridge problem. In late 1950s, two math-
ematicians, Erdo¨s and Re´nyi (ER), made a breakthrough in the classical mathe-
matical graph theory. They had laid a foundation of the random network theory
in which all graphs on a fixed vertex set with a fixed number of edges are equally
distributed.
In the past few years, as high computing technology continues to evolve, detailed
topological information about very large-scale real-world networks are accessible.
These real network structures have shown neither completely regular nor com-
pletely random. Two significant recent discoveries are the small-world effect [3]
and the scale-free effects.
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Figure 1.3: Example of Small-world and Scale-free network. a) Small-world network.
b) Scale-free network.
1.3.1 Small-World phenomenon
The discovery of Small-world networks has revolutionized research in network sci-
ence. The current accepted definition of a small-world network is that it is highly
clustered and has small characteristic path lengths. In other words, in a smal-
l world network, most nodes are not neighbours of one another; however nodes
within some sub-networks are almost neighbours of every others. Furthermore, in
the network, the typical distance between two randomly chosen nodes is propor-
tional to the logarithm of the number of nodes. Many real networks are found
having small-work effect, including food chains, power girds, networks of brain
neurons, and social influence networks.
1.3.2 Scale-Free phenomenon
Over the past few decades, investigators from different fields have discovered that
many networks, like World Wide Web network and cell’s metabolic system are
dominated by a relatively small number of nodes that are linked to many other n-
odes. Networks containing such nodes, or hubs are named as ”scale-free networks”
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and were first proposed by the Baraba´si and Albert (1999). In such networks,
nodes are less clustered and node distribution follows power-law trend. Thus, net-
works are remarkably resistant to accidental failures but extremely vulnerable to
coordinated attack.
1.3.3 Power grids as complex networks
Amount of natural and human complex networks can be modelled as complex
networks, the power grid is one of them. The generators, bus bars, transmission
bars and loads are treated as nodes and the transmission lines are modelled as
edges. For pure topological study, power networks can be treated as a unweighted
complex network. However, in most cases power networks are modelled as weighted
complex networks and the weight of individual edge may represents the MVA
rating, length or MW capacity of the transmission line depends on the applications.
Fig. 1.4 demonstrates the Floridian power grid and its network representation in
which power lines are represented as straight lines between vertices, generators
and loads are represented as square and oval nodes respectively. Generally, the
power grid is considers to be a small network, however, some of the power grids
contain some characteristics of scale free networks.
1.3.4 Vulnerability of complex networks
Real-world systems can be modelled as complex networks, such as power system,
biology network, social network, etc. The components of the system are represent-
ed by functional individuals (nodes) and interactions among them (edges). The
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Figure 1.4: a) Map of the Floridian high-voltage grid [4]. b) Florida grid network
representation, in which power lines are represented as straight lines between vertices.
Generators are represented as squares and loads as ovals. Thicker, darker links represent
multiple power lines between vertices.
uneven distribution of nodes and edges result in that fact that some networks
are more vulnerable than others in certain network failures. Failure of complex
systems in real-world can be characterized as loss of connectivity in the view of
topology.
Vulnerability or robustness of a complex network is deeply connect to the resilience
of the network under different attacks. The most commonly applied attack strate-
gies are nodes attack and edge attack.
• Node attack: remove one or multiple nodes and all connecting edges to the
node in a network
• Edges attack: remove one or multiple edges in a network
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In most cases the failure nodes or edges can be either random or specific selected.
The two different attacks methods are named as random attack and target attack.
Many studies have shown that scale-free networks are robust to random attacks,
they can be highly vulnerable to targeted attacks as opposed to random networks
that are robust to targeted attacks but vulnerable to random attacks [5].
In many real situations, the failures of a few critical nodes or edges may disable the
operation of the whole network and may lead to the collapse of the entire system.
1.4 Motivation and Scope
1.4.1 Motivation
Complex network theory has been applied to solve different large-scale practical
problems in many fields, i.e, social, biological, transportation networks. In power
systems, one of the most important applications of CNT is vulnerability analysis
which aims to define, identify and classify the important nodes or lines in the
networks. Although more accurate models are emerging with advancement in
power research, there are still a large scope of improvement considering:
1. Complexity of the power networks. In power engineering, power-flow study
determines the magnitude and phase angle of the voltage at each bus and the real
and reactive power flowing in each line. To maintain the stability of the network,
bus voltage and frequency are required in certain margin. Thus, power system
vulnerability can be affected by both real and reactive power flow, since either
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quantity can relate to system collapse either through supply-demand mismatch or
voltage collapse;
2. Impact of increasing renewable penetration on networks. The high penetra-
tion of renewable energy generation introduces new technical challenges such as
reduced system inertia or unplanned generation supply characteristics that have
the potential to cause cascading failures, e.g. the recent South Australia blackout
in September 2016.
3. Another important application of CNT in power field is the controllability of
power network. Recent advances indicate that most of nonlinear systems in many
aspects structurally similar to that of linear system. The minimal driver nodes
which could achieve full control of the network can be determined from maximum
matching. However, structural controllability analysis in power system has not
been well studied.
4. Expansion of power networks. While power networks are growing in size and
complexity to meet the increasing power demands and penetration of renewable
generations, few studies have sought methods of optimising this growth such that
the controllability and robustness can be maintained or enhanced.
1.4.2 Research scope
The first part of this thesis is devoted to investigate the vulnerability of power
systems using maximum flow based complex network theory. Considering the
importance of reactive power in stabilising power voltage, power system complex
network model involves both real and reactive power flow. Thus, the importance
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of a line in a power network should be determined by both real and reactive power
flow through it.
The second part of this thesis is dedicated to demonstrate how renewable genera-
tion affecting the power system vulnerability. The high penetration of renewable
energy generation introduces new technical challenges such as reduced system in-
ertia or unplanned generation supply characteristics that have the potential to
cause cascading failures. Further investigation are carried out to assess vulnerable
components in a contemporary power network.
The third part of this thesis introduces a novel effective augmentation method to
expend a complex network such that the total number of driver nodes required to
achieve full control of the network remain the minimum. Thus, any given network
can be augmented under same number of driver nodes.
The final part of this thesis extends the vulnerability analysis and augmentation
method to IEEE 118 bus and South-East Australia networks to verify the feasibili-
ty of the methodologies in real case and therefore provides some recommendations
for SE network expansion.
1.5 Thesis Objectives and Contributions
1.5.1 Objectives
The research of this thesis involves three major parts. The first goal is to identify
vulnerable components in power networks considering power system complexity
and renewable generations. Protection and monitoring of the components could
Introduction 11
potentially prevent the systems from cascading failure. To achieve this goal, the
individual goals can be grouped into two topics:
1. Vulnerability analysis considering important engineering features: Develop pow-
er system complex network models which incorporate network structures and sev-
eral specific features of power systems such as real power and reactive power flow.
2. Vulnerability analysis considering penetration of renewable energy: Develop
a net-ability centrality index to assess vulnerable components in a contemporary
power network with time-varying intermittent wind generation.
The second goal is investigate the vulnerability and augmentation of power net-
works via complex network approaches.
3. Develop a network expansion method such that the structural controllability of
the network maintains and no additional driver nodes required to accommodate
the change.
The final goal is to investigate the feasibility of the proposed vulnerability analysis
and network augmentation method.
4. Investigate the vulnerability changes in network augmentation and verify the
methodologies or algorithm determined above in real power networks (IEEE 118
bus network and South-East Australia transmission network).
1.5.2 Contributions
The contribution of the research which forms this thesis can be summarised as
below:
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1. A maximum flow base complex network method is studied to investigate vul-
nerable lines in power system. Detailed results from illustrative case are presented
and discussed which showing both real and reactive power flow are important in
affecting the vulnerability ranking of a line by newly proposed method:
(a) A novel power grid complex network model which considering both real and
reactive power flow is created. Real power flow provides power balance between
generations and loads. On the other hand, reactive power flow ensures voltage
stability on buses.
(b) A maximum flow algorithm is developed. The criticality of a line is determined
by the portion of maximum power flow though the line.
(c) Fuzzy logic index combination method is implemented to combine the two
centrality indices.
2. To investigate the impact of renewable energy (e.g., wind power) on network
vulnerability, it is necessary to develop a time-varying vulnerability assessment
model which considers many power system physical constraints (like line capacity
limit and generation limit) and intermittent and unpredictable characteristics of
renewable generation. Simulation results from four different cases explain how
different load distribution and wind generation change the vulnerability levels.
The proposed method includes:
(a) An enhanced extended model is developed which involves intermittent wind
generation and time varying load. A stochastic model of wind power generation
and a load model are developed. Meanwhile, a power flow model considering wind
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generation line capacity limit, generation limit, renewable generation dispatch is
designed.
(b) A cascading failure simulator, power dispatch and load shedding algorithm
are presented to simulate the collapse of power network under both low- and high-
betweenness attacks.
3. A novel effective augmentation method is proposed to generate a relatively large
number of network expansion solutions in one time-step while number of driver
nodes maintained. The method allows connecting multiple source and sink nodes
in parallel simultaneously without conflict.
(a) The approach is based on the presence of V-motifs in both the SI and KI net-
work. Number of clusters which are extracted from V-motifs determines number
of the new source and sink nodes can be connected. The procedures of determining
clusters are formulated.
(b) The method determines the maximum augmentable nodes for a given complex
network via non-trivial augmentation.
(c) Extensive studies on synthetic and real networks are presented which indicate
that networks having large average degree tend to have few clusters and thus are
hard to be augmented.
4. IEEE 118 bus and South-East Australia networks are utilised to verify the fea-
sibility of vulnerability analysis and effective augmentation methods in enhancing
the robustness and structural controllability of a growing power network.
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(a) An IEEE 118 bus power network complex network representative is presented.
Nodes match with physical location of generations and loads. Edges’ arrow follows
the direction of power flow.
(b) South-East Australia power network complex network representative is pre-
sented.
(c) Vulnerability analysis and effective augmentation of SE Australia network are
presented. Augmentation recommendations are provided.
1.6 Structure of Thesis
The thesis is organised into the following seven chapters:
Chapter 1 provides a background to the project including brief introduction
of complex network and power system. Next, the motivation and scope of the
research are proposed. Finally the thesis objective and contribution of this research
are highlighted.
Chapter 2 gives a comprehensive literature review of past research studied in the
areas of power system vulnerability analysis and network expansion. The chapter
summarises the existing two main complex network approaches in investigating
power system vulnerability. Furthermore, the concept of structural controllability
and the existing studies of power network expansion are provided. The chapter
concludes by identifying the key issues base on the current knowledge and provid-
ing scopes for improvement.
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Chapter 3 introduces a maximum flow base complex network method to investi-
gate the vulnerability of power systems. The method is derived by considering a
power system as two complex networks based on two different power flows. The
real power flow provides supply to demand balance and reactive power flow main-
tains voltage stable. The maximum flow algorithm is developed to investigate
the centrality level of a arbitrary line in the two complex networks. The indices
are combined to produce the composite vulnerability ranking using fuzzy logic
method.
Chapter 4 proposes a time-varying extended method as a vulnerability measure-
ment to identifying critical lines in power networks particularly considering the
penetration of renewable energy. First of all, the power grid complex network
representative considering stochastic wind generation and time varying load are
provided. Then, an enhanced net-ability model is introduced to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of supplying power from generators to loads. Furthermore, to verify the
propose method, a cascading failure simulator, power dispatch and load shedding
algorithm are developed. Finally, extensive cases are studied and demonstrated.
Chapter 5 introduces a novel augmentation algorithm to expand a complex net-
work without increasing the minimum number of driver nodes required to achieve
full control of the networks. The detail procedures of identifying V-motifs and
clusters are provided. Meanwhile, the maximum augmenatable nodes are formu-
lated. Then, the method is applied to different synthetic networks (scale-free,
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks) and real networks (Social networks, food web, electron-
ic circuit networks etc) which proved that network clusters reduce in number as
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network connectivity and average degree increase. Finally, IEEE 118 bus power
network is applied to verify the proposed method.
Chapter 6 Case study: IEEE 118 bus and South-East Australia power networks
are applied to investigate the feasibility of the proposed vulnerability analysis and
network augmentation methods. First the power system complex network model is
proposed. Then, with the proposed vulnerability analysis method, the vulnerable
lines are identified. The simulation results show that adding additional lines ac-
cordingly could potentially enhance the system robustness. Finally, effective aug-
mentation method is feasible of maintaining the structural controllability of the
network without requiring additional driver-nodes to accommodate the change.
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis with discussion of this research. Also, possible
directions for further works are recommended.
To note that, Matlab is the main software applied in this thesis unless otherwise
specified in each section. Outside of the main text, the bibliography of this thesis is
included, where the cited articles and relevant works and information are provided.
Finally, all my publications including journal and conference papers during the
PhD studies are presented.
1.7 Summary
This chapter has introduced an overall background of complex networks and the
power grids. The motivation and research scope has been provided. Further-
more, the main objectives and contributions have been listed. Finally, the thesis
structure and main contents of each chapter have been briefly outlined.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Overview
This chapter gives a comprehensive literature review of the existing technologies
and efforts have been made in the field of complex network to solving power grid
problems. To begin with, the preliminaries of complex systems including some
basic concepts of complex network and complex network models are covered in
Section 2.2. Section 2.3 introduces the concept of structural controllability. It
explains the methodology of determining minimum driver nodes in complex net-
works. Some important power system features, like power flow and cascading
failure are explained in Section 2.4. In Section 2.5, the existing complex network
methods in investigating power system vulnerability are classified into two main
approaches: topological approaches and hybrid approaches. Furthermore, in Sec-
tion 2.6 the extensive studies are listed in regards to power grid expansion and
structural controllability analysis of power networks. In addition, the key issues
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of the existing methods are listed in Section 2.7. Finally, a brief summary is given
in Section 2.8.
2.2 Complex Network Theory
2.2.1 General concept of complex networks
In complex networks, there are many properties that emerge as consequence of
the structure of the network [6]. An complex network with n number of vertices
and m number edges can be defined as G= (V,E,W), where V={v1, v2, · · · , vn} is
a finite set of vertices, E ⊆ V ⊗ V = {e1, e2, · · · , em} is a sets of edges and W is a
set of link weights. Each edge is composed of a pair of elements of V, such that if
ek = {vi, vj}, where ek ∈E, vi, vj ∈ V, then there is direct edge vi → vj for directed
network. If the network is undirected, then ek = {vi, vj} represents a connection
between node vi and vj. In a network, two nodes vi and vj are adjacent if they
are jointed by a edge e = {vi, vj}. The node degree is the number of links which
are incident with a given node. If the network is directed, a node could have two
different degrees, in-degree which is the number of incoming edges to the node,
out-degree which is the number of outgoing edges from the node.
The following lists some important concepts and definition that will help to better
understand the vulnerability and controllability of complex networks.
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Adjacency matrix
With the concept of node degree, a common representation of the topology of a
network G is though the adjacency matrix which is defined by:
aij =
{ 1 if i, j ∈ E
0 otherwise
(2.1)
The adjacency matrix A: =A(G)=(aij) of a non-directed network is a squared
symmetric matrix as shown in example Fig. 2.1 a. The example of directed network
is illustrated in Fig. 2.1 b.
Laplacian matrix
Another important matrix representation of a network is though its Laplacian
matrix L which is also known as Kirchhoff matrix. The entries of this matrix is
defined as follows:
Lij =
{ −1 if i, j ∈ E
deg(i) if i = j
0 otherwise
(2.2)
where deg(i) is the degree of node i. The Laplacian matrix can also be determined
by L= D - A, where D is the diagonal degree matrix and A is adjacency matrix.
An example is shown in Fig. 2.1.
The Laplacian matrix is positive semi-definite and multiplicity if 0 as an eigenvalue
is equal to number of connected components in the network. The The second
Literature Review 20
1 
4 
3 
2 
1 
4 
3 
2 
0 0
0 0
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
0 0
0 0
 
0 0
0 0
0 1
1 1
1 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
 
1 
4 
3 
2 
   2 0
   0 2
   0 −1
−1 −1
−1 0
   0 0
   
2    0
0   2
 A= A= L= 
a b c 
Figure 2.1: a) Adjacency matrix of a four nodes undirected network. b) Adjacency
matrix of a four nodes directed network. c) Laplacian matrix of network in a.
smallest eigenvalue of L, µ2(L) is known as the algebraic connectivity [7] of the
network. The value of the algebraic connectivity reflects how well connected the
overall graph is. The negative magnitude means the network is not connected.
Degree distribution
An important property for the study of complex network is degree distribution.
For a given network G on n vertices let N(k) denote the number of vertices with
degree k. Then, p(k) = N(k)/n represents the probability that a vertex selected
uniformly at random has degree k. The histogram of p(k) versus k is the degree
distribution of the network. It is natural to expand the definition for directed
network as in- and out-degree distribution.
Studies have shown that for various networks very different in type- social net-
works, citation networks, the web graph — the empirical degree distribution fol-
lows a power law [8, 9]. The power-law distribution p(k) (Fig. 2.2b) is defined
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Figure 2.2: a) Poisson distribution. b) Power-law distribution.
as
p(k) v k−γ k 6= 0 (2.3)
where γ > 0 is the exponent of the distribution. It is important to note that the
network does not depend on the size of the network. That is why this distribution
is also called scale-free. In real situations, the average degree of a network is finite,
thus γ value is typically in the range of 2 < γ < 3. Furthermore, the real networks
are always finite in number, this distribution will have a natural cut-off.
In a random network G(n,p) with n number of nodes and edge probability p in
range 0 to 1. its degree distribution follows Poisson distribution (Fig. 2.2a) for
large n which is shown below:
p(k) =
λke−λ
k!
(2.4)
where λ = np = const.
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Clustering coefficient
One property of a complex network to characterise the nodes and links of complex
networks is the clustering coefficient which is introduced by Watts and Strogatz
in 1998 [3]. The clustering coefficient is the measure of the degree to which a node
in a network tends to cluster with each other.
For a given graph G=(V,E), the global clustering coefficient of a network is denoted
as fraction of adjacent pairs of edges such that all three possible edges connecting
them [10] :
Cg =
3× number of triangles in the network
number of pairs of adjacent edges
(2.5)
where Cg is the global clustering coefficient of the network.
Locally, the the clustering coefficient of node vi (vi ∈ V) is defined as:
Cvi =
number of edges between neighbors of vi(
deg(vi)
2
) (2.6)
Centrality
In network analysis, there are a group of centrality measurements that identify
the most important vertices within a network [11–14]. These centrality indices
tend to identify the most important node(s) in the network, e.g., finding the most
influential person(s) in a social network, key infrastructures in the power network,
and super-spreaders of disease.
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The simplest example of these indices is degree centrality which measures the
importance of nodes base on their degree.
DC(i) = deg(vi) vi ∈ V (2.7)
Closeness centrality measures the how close a node is from the rest of the nodes
in the network and is expressed as:
CC(i) =
n∑
j di,j
(2.8)
where di,j is the length of a geodesic path from node vi to vj, meaning the number
of edges along the path.
The betweenness centrality for each vertex vi quantifies the number of shortest
paths that pass through vi. A shortest path is defined as smallest edge lengths
between two vertices.
BC(i) =
∑
i
∑
j
σst(vi)
σst
vi, vs, vt ∈ V vs 6= vt 6= vi (2.9)
where σst is the total number of shortest paths from node s to node t and σst(v)
is the number of those paths that pass through vi.
Eigenvector centrality is a extension of degree centrality. It measures the influence
of a node in the network. Higher the value a node has, higher the influence the
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node contributes. The eigenvector centrality EC(i) of node vi is given by:
EC(i) =
1
λ
∑
j
aj,iEC(j) (2.10)
where A = aj,i is the adjacency matrix, aj,i =1 if node vi and vj is connected
otherwise, aj,i =0.
2.2.2 Models of complex networks
The topologies differences of complex networks determine the properties variation.
For example some networks, like social networks follow power law degree distri-
bution however, the same property may not appear in power networks. Complex
network models are useful of comparing properties in real networks. This allows
us to understand and investigate a complex network more easily and efficiently.
The Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks
The first model of random graph can track back to Erdo˝s-Re´nyi [15]. This model
starts with n isolated nodes. Then, the probability that an edge is present between
any pair of nodes is p where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. Thus, the network is determined only by
the number of nodes and edges which is denoted by G(n, p).
Figure 2.3 gives an example of small size Erdo˝s-Re´nyi with increasing probability
from zero to one.
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Figure 2.3: An example of 20 nodes Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network with increasing probability
from zero to one.
Figure 2.4: An example of the revolution of the rewiring process in the Watts-Strogatz
model.
Small-World networks
The Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks is the simplest pure random model which does not pro-
duce some important properties of real-world networks. In 1998, Duncan Watts
and Steven Strogatz [3] identified a certain category of small-world networks which
contains some independent structural features, e.g., shortest path length, cluster-
ing efficient.
The Watts-Strogatz model starts by using the following construction (see Fig. 2.4).
When the rewiring probability p = 0, the network is a regular network. In regular
network, each node has the same number of neighbour; i.e. every node has the
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same degree. The relatively simple structure allows us to focus on the complexity
caused by the non-linear dynamics of nodes and edges. Hence, these networks
have been used to study dynamical systems such as disease spread, ecosystems
etc.
On the other hand, when p = 1, the network becomes a pure random network.
The small-world networks falls in between regular networks and random networks.
The average clustering coefficient for these networks is shown as [16]:
C¯g =
3(k − 2)
4(k − 1) (2.11)
Thus, for a network with large average degree, its average clustering coefficient is
approximately 0.75.
Small-world properties can be found in many real-world phenomena, including
food chains, electric power grids, telephone call graphs and so on.
Scale-Free Networks
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks follow Possion distribution. A network whose degree dis-
tribution follows a power law is denoted as a scale-free network. In scale-free
networks, most nodes have low connectivities and only some nodes are highly con-
nected with the rest of the network. Example of some scale-free networks are
social network including collaboration networks, many computer networks and
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protein-protein interaction networks. There have been several attempts to gener-
ate scale-free network properties, e.g. Baraba´si-Albert model [17], copy model [18],
static model [19].
2.3 Controllability of Complex Networks
2.3.1 Kalman rank condition
Controllability as one of the fundamental concepts in modern mathematical con-
trol theory describes the ability of moving the state of the system from any initial
value to desired value with certain admissible manipulations. Consider a N n-
odes directed complex network whose time evolution follows linear, time-invariant
dynamic [20]
x˙(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) (2.12)
where the vector x(t) = {x1(t), x2(t), · · · , xN(t)}T represents the states of nodes in
the system, A ∈ RN×N is the state matrix which denotes the interaction between
nodes. u = {u1(t), u2(t), · · · , uR(t)}T stands for the time dependent input vector
with R (R ≤ N) controllers. B is the N × R control matrix. The Kalman’s
controllability rank condition [21] stipulates that, the system explained in Eq.
(2.12), also denoted as (A,B), is controllable if and only if its controllability
matrix:
C = (B,AB, · · · ,AN−1B) (2.13)
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Figure 2.5: Example of simple network control. a, A directed path can be completely
controlled by controlling the start node X1 only. b, A directed star can never be
completely controlled by controlling X1 only. c, This network is generated by adding
two edges (a32, a23) to the star shown in b. The network is completely controllable
for almost all weights combinations except in some pathological cases, e.g., when the
weights constraint a32a
2
21=a23a
2
31 satisfy, the system is not controllable.
has full rank which can be denoted as rank(C) = N . Theoretically, with known
the values of matrices A and B, the controllability of a network of arbitrary system
can be tested with Kalman’s controllability rank condition.
An example is shown is Fig. 2.5, in which three structures are used to illustrate
the controllability of networks. The linear dynamic is shown in Fig. 2.5a can be
written as

x˙1(t)
x˙2(t)
x˙3(t)
 =

0 0 0
a21 0 0
0 a32 0
 ·

x1(t)
x2(t)
x3(t)
+

b1
0
0
u(t) (2.14)
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The controllability matrix is shown as
C = (B,AB,A2B) = b1

1 0 0
0 a21 0
0 0 a23a21
 (2.15)
Since rank(C) = N, the system is controllable except when those weights equal to
zero.
Similarly, the linear dynamic shows in Fig. 2.5b can be written as

x˙1(t)
x˙2(t)
x˙3(t)
 =

0 0 0
a21 0 0
a31 0 0
 ·

x1(t)
x2(t)
x3(t)
+

b1
0
0
u(t) (2.16)
The controllability matrix is shown as
C = (B,AB,A2B) = b1

1 0 0
0 a21 0
0 a31 0
 (2.17)
In this case rank(C)=2 < N, the system is uncontrollable which matches with the
expectation.
Finally, the Linear dynamic shown in Fig. 2.5c can be written as
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
x˙1(t)
x˙2(t)
x˙3(t)
 =

0 0 0
a21 0 a23
a31 a32 0
 ·

x1(t)
x2(t)
x3(t)
+

b1
0
0
u(t) (2.18)
The controllability matrix is shown as
C = (B,AB,A2B) = b1

1 0 0
0 a21 a23a31
0 a31 a32a21
 (2.19)
In most cases rank(C)=3=N, the system is controllable. In case a32a
2
21 ∝ a23a231,
then rank(C)=2<N then the system will be uncontrollable.
Noticing from above examples, controllability matrix requires exact value of A of
a network and any slightly change of any link’s weight may alter the controlla-
bility state of the system. However, in real situation, the exact values of A are
often unknown or are known approximately for most real networks. Even if all
weights are known, a brute-force search requires to compute the rank of (C) for
up to 2N − 1 distinct combinations to compute a suitable control matrix which is
computationally difficult for large networks. Due to these difficulties, the concept
of structural controllability was introduced.
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2.3.2 Structural controllability
The study of structural controllability was done by Lin in 1970s [22] and extended
by Shields and Pearson [23] and alternatively derived by Glover and Silverman [24].
Recall the definition of structural controllability from Shield and Pearson:
Definition 2.1. (Structural Controllability) A system (A,B) of a linear system
is called structurally controllable if the free parameters in matrices A and B can be
fixed to certain value that the system meets Kalman’s controllability rank condition.
This system is said to be strongly structurally controllable if its controllability is
independent of the free parameters, as long as they are non-zero.
In structural control theory, the elements of both state matrix A and the input
matrix B are forced to be the of following two types: fixed-zeros and free param-
eters. Note that, free parameters can take any real values and each one remains
independent. Then, the structured system denoted by the pair (A,B), can be
determined as G(A, B)=(V, E ), where V = VA ∪ VB as vertex set; E = EA ∪ EB
as edge set.
Note that if a system is structurally controllable then it is controllable for almost
all parameter values except for those pathological cases. In the previous example,
Fig. 2.5a is strongly structurally controllable, since the line weight can be any
vale apart from zero. Fig. 2.5b is structurally uncontrollable and Fig. 2.5c is
structurally controllable but not strongly structurally controllable [25]. When
the weights constraint a32a
2
21 ∝ a23a231 satisfies, the system is not structurally
controllable. Structural controllability theory evaluates the system controllability
and overcomes the effect of imperfect measurement of exact values of parameters.
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Base on the definition of the structural controllability, Lin proposed a simple
theorem to investigate the structural controllability of an arbitrary linear system.
Theorem 2.2. (Lin’s Structural Controllability theorem [22]) A linear control
system (A,B) is structurally controllable if the digraph G(A,B) contains no inac-
cessible nodes and no dilations.
Definition 2.3. (Dilation) The digraph G(A,B) contains a dilation if and only if
there exists a subset S (S ⊂ VA) such that |T (S)| < |S|. T(S) is defined as a set
which contains all origin vertices that have at least one oriented edges pointing to
a vertex in S. Here, the origins are not not allowed to belong to S.
Definition 2.4. (Inaccessible node) A node vi in digraph G(A,B) is denoted as
inaccessible node if there are no directed paths reaching vi from any input vertices.
An example of dilation can be found in Fig. 2.5b where there exists a subset S= {
X2, X3} and T(S)={X1} such that |T (S)| < |S|. Thus, the system is structurally
uncontrollable. Lin’s theorem provides a method to check whether the structured
system is structurally controllable with a given B without calculating the rank of
controllability matrix. However, this thesis is particular interested in the minimum
number of input signal required to satisfy the structurally controllable condition
or in other words, the minimum size of B.
2.3.3 Minimum input theorem
Finding a control matrix B consisting of minimum number of controlled nodes is
a typical controllability problem [26]. Recently, Liu et al. [27] have proven that
the minimum number of input signals NI that required to achieve full control of a
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system G(A) is correlated to the number of disjoint nodes in maximum matching
algorithm. To achieve this, firstly, the definition of matching is recalled.
Definition 2.5. (Matching and maximum matching) Consider a N nodes directed
graph G = (V,E), a matching, M of G can be described as a subset of edges E,
such that no two edges in M share a common vertex. A matching M is said to
be maximum if for any other matching M
′
, that |M | > |M ′|. Thus, M are the
matching links and the nodes pointed by matching links are matched nodes. A
graph may have multiple maximum matching solutions.
Definition 2.6. (Perfect matching) A perfect matching is a maximum matching
that all the vertices are matched nodes. For example, in a directed elementary
cycle, all vertices are matched.
Many existing algorithms are available for finding the maximum matching of a di-
graph, such as greedy algorithm [28], Ford–Fulkerson algorithm [29], Hopcroft–Karp
algorithm [30]. To find the unmatched nodes in maximum matching, the following
steps are introduced:
1) Bipartite representation: divide node set V into two disjoint node sets + and
−, such that any directed edge (Vi, Vj) ∈ E can be represented as (V +i , V −j ) in
the bipartite graph G(V + ∪ V −, E). If there exists a link Vi → Vj in original
network, then a link V +i → V −j will appear in the represented bipartite network.
An example is shown in Fig. 2.6 b in which a five nodes network is represented
into a bipartite network.
2) Maximum bipartite matching: determine the maximum matching (the red edges
in Fig. 2.6 b) of the bipartite graph.
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V1 
 + 
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 + 
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 + 
V5 
+ 
V1 
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 - 
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 - 
V5 
- 
V1 
V2 
V3 
V4 V5 
Unmatched Node Matching Link 
Figure 2.6: Maximum matching in digraph. a, A simple digraph contains five vertices
and five edges. b, the bipartite representation of the digraph shown in a which divides
the node set V into two disjoint node sets + and −, such that any directed edge
(Vi, Vj) ∈ E can be represented as (V +i , V −j ) in the bipartite graph G(V + ∪ V −,
E). Maximum bipartite matching determines the maximum matching of the bipartite
graph with Hopcroft-Karp algorithm. The unmatched nodes in V − are denoted as
driver nodes and colored in yellow.
3) The unmatched nodes in the − set are driver nodes and the unmatched nodes
set is defined as minimum driver nodes set (MDS). In the example, one of possible
driver node set is {V2, V5}.
Theorem 2.7. (Liu’s minimum input theorem [27]) The minimum number of
driver nodes (ND) that required to fully control a network is one if the network is
a perfect matching, and this node can be any single one. On the other hand, it
equals the number of unmatched nodes with respect to any maximum matching.
Nd = max{N − |M∗|, 1} (2.20)
Based on the minimum input theorem, many contributions to structural control-
lability of complex networks have been presented. Menichetti et al. [31] proved
that the number of driver nodes required in a network is determined by the den-
sity of nodes with in degree and out degree equal to one and two. Furthermore,
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in [32], the authors have studied the impact of various network characteristics on
the minimum number of driver nodes ND. The results reveal that clustering and
modularity have no discernible impact on ND. In contract degree correlations
showed a robust effect.
For a given complex network, ND is fixed. However, ND can be reduced by chang-
ing the network structure properly. Wang et al. [33] proposed an optimal control
algorithm to perturbing the network structure by adding minimum number of new
links. By to do so, the network can be fully controlled by a single driving signal.
Similarly, Liu et al. [34] further introduced the concept of control centrality to
quantify the ability of a single node to control a network. The results show that
the distribution of control centrality is mainly determined by the network’s de-
gree distribution. Also, in a directed network without loops, the control centrality
of a node is uniquely determined by its topological position in the underlying
hierarchical structure of the network.
Some other important contributions are: [35] introduced an exact controllability
paradigm based on the maximum multiplicity to identify the minimum set of driv-
er nodes required to achieve full control of networks with arbitrary structures and
link-weight distributions. In [36], the authors proposed a new concept, control
profile, which quantifies the different proportions of control-inducing structures
present in a network. [37] investigated the role of individual nodes in structural
controllability and discovered two distinct control modes, whose emergence is gov-
erned by a bifurcation phenomenon.
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Figure 2.7: Power flow single line diagram
2.4 Power System
2.4.1 Power flow in power networks
In a traditional power network, electricity is generated from power stations and
delivered to end users via transmission and distribution networks. Through power
flow studies, the bus voltage magnitude and angle at each bus in steady state can
be obtained. Then, the real and reactive power flow through each line can be
calculated. Also based on the power flow in the sending end and flow out from
receiving end, the losses in a particular line can also be computed.
Figure 2.7 demonstrates a single line diagram of power flow. The approximate
real power flow in Bus 1 can be formulated as:
P = |VS||VR|(G cos(θS − θR) +B sin(θS − θR))
Q = |VS||VR|(G sin(θS − θR)−B cos(θS − θR))
(2.21)
where |VS|, |VR| are the magnitudes of bus voltage at sending and receiving end
respectively. θS, θR are the corresponding voltage angles. Y12 = G + Bj is the
admittance of the line, where G (conductance) and B (susceptance) are the real and
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reactive part of the admittance. So any given transmission circuit with impedance
of Z = R− jX will have an admittance of
Y =
1
Z
=
R
R2 +X2
− Xj
R2 +X2
(2.22)
In real situation, R is relatively small compared to X, then G will be very small
compared to B, and it is reasonable to approximate Eq. 2.21.
P = |VS||VR|(B sin(θS − θR))
Q = −|VS||VR|(B cos(θS − θR))
(2.23)
As more nodes are connected to the system, it forms a complex network. The
simplified power flow model is beneficial of decreasing computational complexity
in large network.
2.4.2 Cascading failure in power networks
The high consumption of electricity has led to continuous growth of power network
in both size and complexity. One consequence of this changes is that small unex-
pected disturbance, like line tripping, may change the operation conditions of the
other components throughout the system. If the change exceeds the safe limits,
can cause second failure in the system. This process of failure and subsequent
changing of operational conditions can result in a cascading event propagating
through the system and eventually lead to a large scale system collapse.
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Incidents of such cascading failures have been observed in many countries, and led
to huge economic losses. Table 2.1 shows some power outages caused by cascading
failure.
2.5 Vulnerability of Power Grids
Vulnerability of a complex network measures the reliability of the network against
different sorts of attacks (node and edge removals) [38]. In power networks, ”ro-
bustness” or ”vulnerability” (its opposite concept) are often used to measure to
what extent a power grid has high reliability or low reliability respectively when
a disruptive event emerges. Extensive works have been made to investigating the
vulnerability of power networks. In this broad field there are two main different
approaches. The first one is based solely on topological concepts and uses metrics
such as mean path length, clustering coefficient among many others. The other
approach consists of introducing some electrical engineering concept in the effort
of enhancing the topological approach, some of example approaches are electrical
Table 2.1: Cascading failure caused power outages
Date Location Customer Primary cause
1965
Northeast
America
30 Million+ Protection relay setting
1999 Southern Brazil 75-97 Million Lightning strike
2003
Northeast
America
55 Million Software bug
2003 Italy 56 Million Storm
2003 London 500,000 Problem with a cable feed
2006 European 15 Million Routine disconnection
2012 Northern India 230 Million Extreme temperature
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betweenness, net-ability and others. In the following section, the detail of each
approach is introduced.
2.5.1 Topological approaches
The topological approaches focus on structure vulnerability of power networks: a
set of nodes connected by a set of edges. These works resort to complex network
(CN) metrics such as degree, betweenness and clustering coefficient, hence no
electrical concepts are considered [39, 40].
Albert et al [41] studied a US power grid (14099 nodes and 19657 edges) from a
network topological perspective. The vulnerability study is based on evaluating
its ability to transfer power between generators and consumers when certain nodes
are removed from the network. The investigation concludes that the power grid is
robust to most random perturbations (remove low degree nodes) but vulnerable
to target failures, for example, removal of some key transmission substations could
result in great reduce of its ability to function.
The analysis of topological aspects of the Italian power grid (341 nodes and 517
edges) using complex network approach has been tackled in [42]. In the paper, the
authors assume that power is sent from each generator to all other distribution
substations using the shortest paths from Eq. 2.9. The vulnerability in the network
is calculated based on the efficiency drop after attacks. The simulation draw
similar results as shown in [41].
Three European electric power grids, i.e., Spanish 400 KV grid, French 400 KV grid
and Italian 380 KV grid have been applied for topological vulnerability analysis
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in [43]. The authors introduce a method to add edges to an existing power grid
intelligently to reduce system vulnerability. The results show that the robustness
of Italian power network can be increased significantly with the simple addition
of a single edge.
The US networks have also been utilised for cascading failure analysis in [44] to
determine the important nodes and lines. The authors combine the CN approach
with a more realistic distribution of load among the neighbouring nodes. In this
work, the load on the affected node is redistributed to its neighbouring nodes
according to not the node degree [45, 46] but the preferential probability. The
experimental work reveals that cascading failure is induced and enhanced when
the tolerance parameter value is smaller than the critical threshold. Furthermore,
Weil et al, [47] proposes a new method to assess the network vulnerability through
the cascading faults graph based on fault chains, which is a statistical graph that
comprehensively considers the physical, operational and structural features of elec-
trical networks.
An interesting efficiency method has been introduced in [48] to investigate the
vulnerability of North America power grid. The method categorises substation-
s into three groups, generation substations, transmission substations and loads.
The vulnerability the system is quantified as change of average efficiency of the
network [16] before and after the occurrence of breakdowns. The results indicate
that the loss of a single substation can result in up to 25% loss of transmission
efficiency by triggering an overload cascade in the network. While the loss of a
single node can inflict substantial damage, subsequent removals have only incre-
mental effects, in agreement with the topological resilience to less than 1% node
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loss.
The structural vulnerability analysis in interconnected power system has been s-
tudies in [49]. The authors investigate how interdependence among systems affects
cascading behaviours and therefore changes vulnerability of power network. The
investigation focuses on networks abstracted from two interdependent power grids
in the south eastern of the United States and the two network are interconnected
via 8 external links. The model in [49] is based on applying the classic “sandpile
model” of Bak-Tang-Wiesenfeld [50] to the corresponding network graph com-
posed of nodes and links, each node having a capacity for keeping sand grains
(viewed as load for power grids). The results reveal that some interconnectivity
is beneficial since it suppresses the largest cascades in each system. However, too
much interconnectivity many become detrimental. This is because interconnec-
tions open pathways for neighbouring networks to inflict large cascades. Also,
new interconnections increase capacity and total possible load, which fuels even
larger cascades.
2.5.2 Hybrid approaches
As emphasized in [51–54] the purely topological approach may result in inaccurate
results, since it neglects some of the important engineering features. Here three
main differences are listed. First of all, in a power grid, power is flowing from
a generator to a load through the entire network not only the shortest path.
The calculation of power flow in the transmission network is a non-linear and
iterative process. The second difference is that in conventional CN analysis, all
nodes are assumed to be identical. However, the assumption does not hold in
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real case. In transmission networks, nodes tend to have different properties. For
example, generator nodes produce power and load nodes only receive power (except
some nodes with distribution generators attached). Finally, in power girds, the
line flow capacity of a transmission line restricts its ability to transport power.
As a consequence, when applying CN theory to power network, edges should be
weighted (line flow capacity) and directed (since electric power flows direction).
An example of a hybrid approach is [14, 55, 56], which delves into the vulnera-
bility of power grids by using maximum flow based CN model that includes line
admittance (line weights) and line direction in the pure topological model. In the
model, maximum amount of power flowing from a generator to a load is restricted
by the line capacities. The links which carry more portion of power in the process
are given a higher weight. The results indicate the failure of highly weighted lines
would cause a significant decrease in the performance of the network. This is be-
cause their failure could cause a huge load shift to adjacent links which, in turn,
might overload and fail, causing further load shift and reduction in performance.
Apart from maximum flow model, DC and AC flow models are considered in many
hybrid approaches [57–60].
[57] using DC power flow model to analyse power system vulnerability under un-
observable false data injection (FDI) attack. [58] considers line impedances and
DC power flow model in investigating North America power grid with 29500 n-
odes and 50000 edges. The DC power flow model is used to simulate the network
vulnerability under nodes removal. Connectivity loss and blackout size have been
selected to measure the vulnerable levels of the system. On the other hand, [60]
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studies the vulnerability analysis and recognition of key nodes in power grids based
on the AC power flow model and the network topology weighted with admittance.
Furthermore,[61] proposes a metric, effective graph resistance, as a vulnerability
measure to determine the critical lines in a power grid. The concept of effective
resistance makes it possible to construct the electrical topology of a power grid
rather than the physical connection as a physical topology does. The effective
graph resistance is tested in IEEE 118 bus network and the results show that a
power grid with a relatively smaller effective graph resistance implies a relatively
more robust power grid with respect to cascading failures.
Another important approach is [52], which proposes an extended topological ap-
proach which incorporate several specific features of power systems such as electri-
cal distance, power transfer distribution factors and line flow limit. The proposed
a new centrality index, net-ability, to identify the most critical components in
large-scale power grids. The feasibility of the method has been tested in IEEE-
118, IEEE-300 and Italian power grids. Base on net-ability index, [62] develops a
novel attack strategy, named as risk graph. Different from the existing load-based
and degree-based attack strategies, the risk graph identifies several nodes such
that failure of these nodes is more likely to cause large cascading failure. The
proposed approaches has been further investigated in [63].
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2.6 Augmentation of Power Grids
2.6.1 Augmentation of complex networks
Network expansion or augmentation is a ubiquitous feature in our rapidly growing
technological society. It manifests in numerous and diverse scientific fields that
include indexing and searching of the internet [64], information dissemination on
social networks [65, 66], financial and banking networks [67, 68], power distribution
networks [69], epidemic outbreaks in human populations [70], and a vast range of
computer applications from virus spread [71, 72] to cyber warfare [73]. Expan-
sion often occurs naturally, as in social networks, where new users may join and
instantly create new connections. For other networks, increases in demand often
naturally lead to growth. For example, higher electricity usage requires the con-
nection of new power stations and loads to the existing power network to balance
the extra demand. In biological contexts, where many exciting frontier network
projects are now appearing, questions arise as for example, how can one design a
“brain on a chip” by engineering neuronal network growth [74]. An immediate and
important question, then, is how connections should be added from the existing
network so that a certain optimal performance is achieved such as maintaining
or enhancing overall controllability. Despite the widespread necessity to augment
networks, and the intense scientific interest in network science, very little is known
about how one might begin to expand a network subject to controllability con-
straints. The first systematic study that sets out to solve some of these problems
is firstly provided.
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Figure 2.8: The world energy consumption forecast
2.6.2 Power network expansion
Network expansion is a ubiquitous feature in numerous and diverse fields, power
network is one of them. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administra-
tion’s latest International Energy Outlook 2018 [75], world energy consumption
will grow by 28% between 2015 and 2040 as shown in Fig 2.8. To meet the in-
creasing electricity usage, many new power plants (e.g., thermal power plants,
hydro power plants, renewable power plants, new clean power plants, etc) and
substations are built and connected to the existing power network.
Power network expansion plan is usually an investment plan of placing new gener-
ation units and loads in an existing network such that the total cost is minimum
and the new power network after expansion is still secure reliable and stable.
Many factors contribute to the planning process of power systems. For example,
the availability of fuel determines placement locations of new generation units;
environmental concerns and regulatory issues govern the types of generation; elec-
tricity demands, conditions of existing network and network constraints decide the
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network connection and amount of power generation of each unit. Thus, power
network expansion problem is equivalent to finding a optimization of generation
mix, with the entire electrical loads and all the generating units are considered.
The subject of generation expansion planning has been studied extensively. Many
of the earlier papers on the subject as available in the literature studied different
techniques of solving the expansion problem such as neural network [76], genetic
algorithm [77], tabu search [78], particle swarm optimization [79], fuzzy logic [80]
etc. On the other hand, extensive studies have been carried out on considering
more and more constraints into the problem. These planing criteria are usually
classified into the following categories:
• Geographical limitation: fuel availability, generation units size, location of
generation units, geographical distribution of electricity demand
• Network performance: system reliability and stability measured via contin-
gency analysis, loss of load probability, voltage and frequency variation and
reserve margin
• Cost efficiency (cost optimality): fuel transportation routes, fuel prices, dis-
count rate environmental requirement and carbon trading revenues, cost of
un-served energy etc
None of above have take the power system’s controllability with minimal drivers
into account. However, if the power systems are not fully controlled, any faults
may lead to partial or full blackout [81].
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2.6.3 Structural controllability of power network
Structural controllability analysis has been applied in different complex networks
in different fields, such as metabolic networks, [82, 83], neuronal networks [84], hu-
man signaling network [85]. Recently, structural controllability analysis has been
applied to power networks [86], where interesting properties have been discovered.
Li et al. [81] applied the minimum input theorem into power networks (IEEE 118
and 300 bus system) to identify the critical nodes. The authors also proposed a
controllability index to rank the critical nodes. They demonstrated that failure
of the important nodes can clearly increase the minimum number of driver nodes,
meaning there needs to be an increase the number of driver nodes to maintain full
control of the network, and leads to a significant driver nodes shift. Lu et al. [87]
investigated the attack vulnerability of network controllability for the canonical
model networks as well as the real-world networks subject to attacks on nodes and
edges. The results reveal that the node-based strategies are often more harmful
to the network controllability than the edge-based ones.
Another interesting application is shown in [88] in which the authors investigated
how topological factors affect the fraction of driver nodes in an ensemble of 58
U.S. city-level power transmission networks in seven U.S. states. The topological
indexes applied in the paper include vertex degree, shortest path length, cluster-
ing coefficient, betweenness centrality, meshedness coefficient, and proportions of
nodes in network controllable configurations. The results showed that the driver
nodes tend to have low degree, low betweenness and to avoid high high triangu-
lation sub-graph nodes. However, a high proportion of k = 1 nodes will increase
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the proportion of driver nodes needed to control the networks, which becomes
disadvantageous to the power systems.
2.7 Key Issues Identified
Following the comprehensive literature review performed in this chapter, the sub-
sequent key issues were identified:
1. Previous research on power system vulnerability analysis has only considered
real power flow in the network and the effect of reactive power was neglected.
However, power system vulnerability should take both real and reactive pow-
er flow into consideration, since either quantity can relate to system collapse
either through supply-demand mismatch or voltage collapse. Thus, a new
technique is required to identify the vulnerability index of a power system
which considers both real and reactive power flow.
2. Many previous research studies have not considered the effect of the increas-
ing number of volatile renewable generators (mostly onshore wind and solar)
to the network vulnerability. Other proposed methods are only available for
static state analysis, while, in a real situation, demands and generations are
changing all the time. Due to the characteristics of renewable energy, a node
in a power network can act as either a generator or a load depending on the
the net-power. Thus, load redistributions from failure at high power demand-
s can be catalyst for cascading failures which is neglected in their analysis.
Therefore, a time-varying vulnerability measurement method is needed.
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3. Recent research studies have neglected the fact that the most real complex
system are not static, but continuously growing over time. The network
expansion can occur naturally, as in social networks, where new users may
join and instantly create new connections. For other networks, increases
in demand often naturally lead to growth. For example, higher electricity
usage, low-carbon mission require the connection of new power stations and
loads to the existing power network to balance the extra demand. However,
the question is how to augment a complex network such that the minimum
number of driver nodes required to achieve the full control of the network is
conserved without change.
4. The existing power network expansion studies are mainly focused on min-
imising cost and increasing network performance by applying different tech-
niques and involving more physical constrains. Few of these have considered
the vulnerability and controllability of augmented networks with minimal
driver nodes. If the power systems are not fully controlled any faults may
lead to partial or full blackout.
2.8 Summary
This chapter has presented a comprehensive review of complex network and power
systems, particularly related to the application of complex network theory in in-
vestigating the vulnerability and augmentation of power grid. The chapter starts
with introducing some fundamental properties of complex network theory. Then,
the concepts of structural controllability and minimum input theorem have been
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presented. In addition, the existing various vulnerability analysis and power net-
work expansion methodologies have been covered. Within the these studies, some
key issues have been listed at the end. Overall, this chapter serves as a foundation
for the rest of the thesis
Chapter 3
Vulnerability Analysis: Maximum
Flow Based Method
3.1 Overview
As a preliminary step toward solving the problems presented earlier, this chapter
introduces a maximum flow based complex network method to investigate the vul-
nerability of power systems. This chapter is organized as follows: the introduction
and background of vulnerability assessment of power systems are presented in sec-
tion 3.2. The modeling of the power system and the methodology of vulnerability
centrality index identification is detailed in section 3.3. In section 3.4 and 3.5,
the process and results of identifying critical lines in the IEEE 14 bus system are
demonstrated. The conclusion and future works are drawn in section 3.6.
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3.2 Maximum Flow Based Complex Network Method Overview
In CNT, any complex network such as biological systems, social networks, tech-
nological networks and power system networks can be simplified or modeled as
a set, G={N,E,W}, where N is the set of nodes, E is the sets of links and W
are weights of edge set elements. A power system can be treated as a weighted
complex network with multiple nodes and edges, where the generators, bus bars
and loads are generally considered to be nodes and transmission lines are modeled
as edges.
In the power system, both real and reactive powers can only be generated from
source nodes (generators) and delivered to sink nodes (loads) though edges (trans-
mission lines).
The overview of proposed method in identifying the vulnerability level of trans-
mission lines of a power system is presented in Fig.3.1. The process is defined as
follows:
• System modeling: model a power grid into two complex networks (real power
flow network and reactive power flow network). In each network, the electri-
cal components and lines are represented as nodes and lines respectively.
• Maximum flow centrality index: apply maximum flow algorithm and de-
termine the centrality index for each line in two different networks. At this
stage, each line will have two different indices which represent the importance
of the line in the network.
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• Indices compositing: combine the two indices into one composite centrality
index. The value of a index represents the importance of the line in the
network.
In the following sections, each step will be introduced in detail.
3.3 Complex Network Model of Power System
Consider a power system consisting n nodes and m edges. Applying nodal analysis
to the system,
[INode] = [YBus] [VNode] (3.1)
Figure 3.1: Overview of the maximum flow based complex network method
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Where, [INode] is the n × 1 vector of nodal injected currents, [VNode] is the n × 1
vector of nodal voltages, and [YBus] is the n×n nodal admittance matrix of power
system. A set of power flow equations is derived in Eq. (3.1). The power flow
analysis is performed to determine the steady state operating condition of a power
system on the graph edges and the main constraints of the system operating under
steady state conditions are:
• Node voltage magnitudes remain close to the nominal values (≤ ±5% from
the rated values)
• Generators and compensators at source nodes include both real and reactive
power limits
• Edges must not be overloaded (i.e. P and Q limits)
Thus, power flow on each edge (i.e. LFi,j) can be defined with the following
equation:
LFij = ((Vi − Vj)Yij)∗Vi (3.2)
where i, j represent bus numbers belonging to n. Vi, Vj are bus voltages with
magnitude |Vi| , |Vj| and voltage angles δi, δj respectively. Yij is the power network
admittance matrix element with magnitude |Yij| and angle Θij. Eq. (3.2) involves
both real and reactive power flows though edge Ei,j. Since the reactance X is
much greater than the resistance R, then |Yij| ≈ |1/Zij|. Thus, the real power
flow Pij and the reactive power flow Qij on edge Eij can be defined as:
Pij = |Vi| |Vj| |Yij| sin(δi − δj) (3.3)
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Qij = |Vi| |Vi| |Yij| − |Vi| |Vj| |Yij| cos(δi − δj) (3.4)
In a stable power system, the bus voltage magnitudes are always close to the rated
value (1 pu) and the voltage angle differences across the branches are small enough
in the steady state [89] such that sin(δi− δj) ≈ δi− δj and cos(δi− δj) ≈ 1. Thus,
Eq. (3.3) and Eq. (3.4) can be simplified as:
Pij ≈ |Yij| (δi − δj) (3.5)
Qij ≈ |Yij| (|Vi| − |Vj|) (3.6)
It is clear that the real power flow is mainly affected by the magnitudes of line
admittance and voltage angle differences. Reactive power flow is dominated by
the magnitudes of the line admittance and the magnitude of the voltage difference
terms. Thus, Eq. (3.5) and Eq. (3.6) identify the capacities of the edges to deliver
real and reactive powers which can be used to model a power network.
3.4 Maximum Flow Theory
Maximum flow [90] is defined as the maximum overall flow capacity from nodes
to nodes which pass through multiple directly or indirectly connected edges. The
well-known method used to determine the maximum flow from one node to another
is Ford-Fulkerson algorithm (Algorithm 1) which is applied in this thesis.
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Algorithm 1 Ford–Fulkerson Algorithm
1: Inputs Graph G with flow capacity c, a source node s, and a sink node k
2: Output A flow f from s to k which is a maximum.
3: Start with initial flow as 0
4: While there is a augmenting flow from s to k
5: Add this path-flow to flow f
6: End while
7: Return f
By adding the flow augmenting path to the flow already established in the graph,
the maximum flow will be reached when no more flow augmenting paths can be
found in the graph. However, there is no certainty that this situation will ever
be reached, so the best that can be guaranteed is that the answer will be correct
if the algorithm terminates. In the case that the algorithm runs forever, the flow
might not even converge towards the maximum flow.
An example of directed power flow is shown in Fig. 3.2 with one source node and
one sink node. The maximum flow of each edge is limited by its maximum capac-
ity or weight. In this case, the maximum flow from source to sink is 4p.u. and
the maximum flow on each edge is defined and labeled in the figure (denominators
of fractions represent the line capacities and numerators are actual power flows).
Maximum flow in the power system gives the system the maximum possible power
delivery from generators to loads, which could be an index to identify the impor-
tant edges in the network. Let Cij be the centrality index of edge Eij, LF
uv
ij be
the portion of flow through the edge Eij with maximum flow from source node u
to sink node v (where u 6= v), the Cij can be defined as:
Cij =
m∑
u=1
n∑
v=1
LF uvij (3.7)
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Figure 3.2: Example of maximum flow on a directed and weighted complex network
Eq. (3.7) illustrates a new centrality index based on maximum power flow which
consists of both real and reactive terms. This is significant, since the delivery of
real power to a load in conventional power systems is coupled with the provision
of reactive power to provide localised voltage support. A failure to meet the
local demand for either real or reactive power may lead to either a large scale
or localised system failure, either through demand-supply mismatch or voltage
collapse. Hence Eq. (3.7) can be separated into two centrality indices (i.e. the
real power centrality index and the reactive power centrality index) based on the
model defined in previous section. This separation is required since the real and
reactive power flows have different constraints which will now be explained.
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3.5 Centrality Indices
3.5.1 Real power centrality index
In the real power flow network, generators are considered as source nodes and
loads are treated as sink nodes. Power can only flow from source nodes to sink
nodes through the directed edges. The maximum real power deliver from source
nodes must not exceed the maximum real power generation limit. And also, the
weight of edges which is defined in Eq. (3.5) must not be overloaded.
For a real power system network with m source nodes and n sink nodes, let P uvmax
be the maximum real power flow from source u to sink v and P uvij be the portion of
flow through the edge Eij. Thus, the average real power centrality index C
Real
ij of
edge Eij can be defined as the real power centrality index divided by the maximum
real power flow viz.:
CRealij =
m∑
u=1
n∑
v=1
P uvij
m∑
u=1
n∑
v=1
P uvmax
(3.8)
3.5.2 Reactive power centrality index
On the other hand, in the reactive power flow network, both generators and reac-
tive power compensators are considered as source nodes. The nodes which require
reactive power are seen as sink nodes. Reactive power must flow from sources to
sinks. However, the reactive power flows on edges are bidirectional. Furthermore,
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since reactive power and voltage control services are required to be provided lo-
cally, reactive power flow in the model should be localized not system-wide. This
means reactive power can only flow from source nodes to local sink nodes.
For a reactive power system network with m source nodes and n sink nodes, k sink
nodes exist in the local region of each source node u. Similar to the real power
flow, Quvmax is defined as the maximum reactive power flow from source u to sink v
and Quvij is the portion of flow through the edge Eij. The average reactive power
centrality index CReactiveij of edge Eij is defined as:
CReactiveij =
m∑
u=1
k∑
v=1
Quvij
m∑
u=1
k∑
v=1
Quvmax
k ∈ n (3.9)
3.5.3 Centrality index identification using fuzzy logic method
Since two centrality indices are identified in section IID, a decision making method
is required to combine these two indices into one composite centrality index. Mul-
tiple criteria decision-making methods were available to deal with the problem of
ranking under multiple criteria [91]. However, in power systems, it is impossible
to precisely quantify the importance of real and reactive power in the network.
A more realistic way is to use linguistic terms to describe the desired value and
important weight of criteria, e.g. “very low”, “medium”, “high”, “very high”.
Due to this type of existing fuzziness, a fuzzy logic (FL) method [92] is applied
to combine both the real CRealij and reactive C
Reactive
ij centrality indices to get the
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total centrality index CTotalij . To implement fuzzy logic technique the following
three steps are required:
• Fuzzification - Converts crisp data into fuzzy data or Membership Functions
(MFs)
• Fuzzy Inference Process - Combine membership functions with the control
rules to derive the fuzzy output
• Defuzzification - Convert fuzzy outputs into crisp variables
In this case, FL involves two inputs and one output. For each input fuzzy set, five
subsets are defined as very high vulnerability (VHV), high vulnerability (HV),
medium vulnerability (MV), low vulnerability (LV) and very low vulnerability
(VLV). Output fuzzy sets can be categorized into five categories shown as very
high (VH), high (H), medium (M), low (L) and very low (VL). It can be seen clearly
from Fig.3.3, for each input fuzzy set, the Y axis value is always in a range of 0
to 1 and the X axis value is defined as 0 to the largest value of the corresponding
centrality index. The fuzzy subset values of inputs are decided by the data density
and data distribution in the map. To obtain more accurate output element values,
the input fuzzy set can be divided into smaller subsets.
After fuzzification of the input and output data, the rule table as shown in Table
3.1 can be specified. The fuzzy rule is represented by a sequence of the form
IF-THEN which associates a condition to an output. There are a maximum of
twenty-five rules existing in the table relating the five real and five reactive input
fuzzy sets. To illustrate, a rule which combines two inputs and one output is
defined as IF (CRealij is HV) and (C
Reactive
ij is MV) THEN (C
Total
ij is M).
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Table 3.1: Rule Table
aaaaaaaaa
CRealij
CReactiveij
VHV HV MV LV VLV
VHV VH VH H H M
HV H H M M M
MV H H M L L
LV H M M L VL
VLV M M L VL VL
The output derived from the combination of inputs, output membership functions
and fuzzy rules, is still a fuzzy element. In our case, for given real and reactive
centrality indices (CRealij and C
Reactive
ij ), twenty five sets of fuzzy outputs can be
calculated. To convert a linguistic output variable to a crisp variable, a defuzzi-
fication is required. There are many defuzzification techniques (e.g. Mean of
Maximum method, Center of Gravity method and the Height method). In this
chapter the center of gravity (COG) method [92] is applied, which allows for the
definition of the composite centrality index as:
CTotalij =
n∑
k=1
(centerkij · strengthkij)
n∑
k=1
strengthkij
(3.10)
where, centerij denotes the center value of the output area and strengthij is the
corresponding degree of membership. n is number of output members in this case
is twenty five.
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Figure 3.4: IEEE 14 bus system
3.6 Case Study: Identify Important Lines
This section demonstrates the application of the composite real and reactive cen-
trality index method to identify the vulnerable lines in the IEEE 14 bus system, as
shown in Fig.3.4 which is composed of 20 lines and 14 buses, including 2 generator
buses and 10 load buses. MATLAB is used to run a simulation of this system, al-
lowing the calculation of the composite centrality index, according to the following
procedure.
First, two IEEE 14 bus power system models (real power flow model and reactive
power flow model) are built in MATLAB according to the methods defined in
section IIA. The real power flow network model considers generators as source
nodes which are node 1 and node 2 and takes nodes 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12,
13 and 14 as sink nodes. The maximum net real power (maximum real power
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Figure 3.5: IEEE 14 bus power system centrality index simulation result. (a) shows
the real power flow centrality. (b) shows the reactive power flow centrality index
generation minus the real power demand on that node) which can be delivered to
the system from source nodes 1 and 2 are 332.4 MW and 118.3 MW respectively. In
contrast with the real power flow model, the reactive power flow model has 5 source
nodes (node 1, 2, 3, 6 and 8), 8 sink nodes (node 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14)
and 20 undirected edges. The net reactive power capacities (maximum reactive
power generation minus reactive power demand on that node) of source nodes
are 10 Mvar, 37.3 Mvar, 21 Mvar, 16.5 Mvar, 24 Mvar respectively. Moreover, the
weight of edges in these models are calculated based on Eq. (3.5) and Eq. (3.6).
Then, the real power flow centrality index (CRealij ) values and reactive power flow
centrality index (CReactiveij ) values can be identified which are shown in Fig. 3.5.
It is clear that some edges such as E1−2 and E2−5 have relatively high CRealij and
CReactiveij . On the other hand, edges with low C
Real
ij but large values of C
Reactive
ij ,
for example, E7−8, E4−3, mean that these edges are critical for reactive power flow
Vulnerability Analysis: Maximum Flow Based Method 65
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
E
1−2
E
1−5
E
2−3
E
2−4
E
2−5
E
4−3
E
4−7
E
4−9
E
 5−4
E
5−6
E
6−11
E
6−12
E
6−13
E
7−9
E
8−7
E
9−10
E
9−14
E
10−11E
12−13
E
13−14
Real Power CentralityIndex C
ij
Real
R
e
a
c
ti
v
e
 P
o
w
e
r 
C
e
n
tr
a
lit
y
In
d
e
x
  
 C
ijR
e
a
c
ti
v
e
Figure 3.6: IEEE 14 bus real and reactive power flow centrality index cluster plot,
Eij denotes edge between node i and edge j
but insignificant for real power flow. Similarly, edges with high CRealij but low
CReactiveij , illustrate that these edges are vital for real power flow but unimportant
for reactive power flow. Edges with both low CRealij and C
Reactive
ij , such as E13−14
and E9−14, show that these edges are not critical for either real nor reactive power
flow. Fig. 3.6 shows the centrality indices for these edges in a plane with CRealij as
X-axis and CReactiveij as Y -axis.
Finally, the power system centrality index for each edge can be calculated by com-
bining the two real and reactive centrality indices according to the fuzzy logic
method defined in section IIE. Fig. 3.3 demonstrates the membership functions
for the input variables (CRealij , C
Reactive
ij ) and the output variable. It is clear that
for each input variable, five linguistic variables are defined. Based on the fuzzy
decision rules and defuzzification process, the composite power system centrality
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Table 3.2: Power centrality index ranking
Ranking Edge Aggregated Power Real Power
Number Number Centrality Index Centrality Index
1 E1−2 0.84 0.58
2 E2−5 0.74 0.52
3 E4−7 0.69 0.26
4 E5−4 0.68 0.25
5 E2−4 0.67 0.25
6 E7−9 0.60 0.26
7 E5−6 0.59 0.24
8 E7−8 0.52 0
index CTotalij can be derived. Take edge E5−6 as an example, the process of calcu-
lating CTotal5−6 can be roughly divided into three steps. First, apply maximum flow
theory to identify the values of CReal5−6 , C
Reactive
5−6 which are 0.24 and 0.16 respec-
tively. Then the fuzzy logic method is applied to process these two inputs and
produce twenty five output fuzzy sets. Finally, for CReal5−6 , of 0.24 and C
Reactive
5−6 of
0.16, the fuzzy output CTotal5−6 for this input pair computed with Center of Gravity
defuzzification method is
CTotal5−6 ≈
0.7× 0.6 + 0.5× 0.5
0.6 + 0.5
≈ 0.56 (3.11)
As a demonstration, this equation only considers two main output fuzzy sets.
Table 3.2 illustrates the top eight ranked vulnerable edges based on the CTotalij
values. For comparison purposes, the CRealij values of these edges are also listed. It
is clearly that the edge between node 7 and node 8 (E7−8) has zero CRealij , however,
this does not necessary mean this edge is not important. Instead E7−8 has a high
reactive power flow significance and failures of this edge could cause a significant
effect on power delivery efficiency and system stability. There are many other links
with low CRealij values, but high C
Reactive
ij such as E4−3. Therefore, in this case, the
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traditional method which only takes the real power flow into consideration fails to
calculate a precise line vulnerability assessment of a power system. Furthermore,
for links with the same CRealij , C
Total
ij can be a better option to separate them. For
example, E5−4 and E2−4 have the same CRealij value, but E5−4 has a higher reactive
flow centrality index, and thus it is ranked higher from a composite vulnerability
perspective.
3.7 Summary
This chapter has proposed a novel centrality index which is derived by considering
the power system as two complex networks, a real power flow CN and a reactive
power flow CN. Each CN has its own power system features and constraints. First
of all, two models with associated power flow constraints have been made. Then,
two centrality indices (CRealij , C
Reactive
ij ) are identified to assess the vulnerability
within its own CN. Finally, these indices were combined to produce the composite
centrality index CTotalij for the power system. Edges with larger the C
Total
ij value
are more critical in the system.
Since a power system is a complex non-linear dynamic system, it is very difficult to
consider all the electrical topological properties of a real power system. There are
many aspects that could be included, to produce a better vulnerability assessment.
In next section, a new centrality index with considering wind generations will be
introduced.
Chapter 4
Vulnerability Analysis: Enhanced
Extended Model
4.1 Overview
To replace ageing conventional generation, while moving to a low-emissions fu-
ture, an increasing number of renewable generators (e.g., wind, solar, hydrogen,
fuel cells) are being installed. The high penetration of renewable energy generation
introduces new technical challenges such as reduced system inertia or unplanned
generation supply characteristics that have the potential to cause cascading fail-
ures, e.g. the recent South Australia blackout in September 2016.
This chapter proposes a time-varying net-ability ratio, as a vulnerability measure-
ment to determine the critical lines in a power network, particularly considering
on-shore wind generation. Section 4.2 provides the power grid complex network
model including both wind energy and enhanced power flow models. Section 4.3
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introduces extended model and demonstrates the net-ability ratio identification
process. Section 4.4 demonstrates three case studies to verify the proposed method
in different conditions. Section 4.5 concludes the chapter with discussions.
4.2 Power Grid with Wind Generation as A Complex Net-
work
In power networks, the patterns of reaction to outages exhibit similarities to the
nodes/edges failure in complex networks as mentioned in literature. Thus, a power
network can be modeled as a graph, E = {B,L,W}, where B is the set of nodes
(i.e. substations, buses), L is the set of links (i.e. power lines) and W is the set of
edge weights (i.e. line flow limits).
Nodes in the power network can be further distinguished into the following cat-
egories based on their various functionalities: G nodes (positive net-power), T
nodes (zero net-power) and D nodes (negative net-power), where, G∪ T ∪D = B
and net-power is calculated as power generation minus power demand on the bus.
Thus, not all the generator buses are G nodes, e.g. when the power generation
on a bus is less than the its local power demand then the bus is still considered
to be a D node. Here, T nodes represent buses which have no generators and
demand. Furthermore, for a power network, the power is generated from G nodes
and delivers to D nodes via the network topology.
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4.2.1 The stochastic model of wind power generation
The intermittent and unpredictable characteristics of renewable resources, like
wind energy cause wind farms (WFs) to be non-dispatchable energy sources and
limits the potential penetration of renewable generation into the electric power
network [93]. In this thesis, wind generations are modelled to represent the char-
acteristics of the renewable.
A number of probabilistic and stochastic models were used to describe the prob-
abilistic density function of the wind speed, e.g. normal distribution, Weibull
distribution [94] and autoregressive model [95]. This chapter adopts the widely
used Weibull distribution model. It is given by
f(v) = (
β
λ
)(
v
λ
)β−1exp− (v
λ
)β, β, λ > 0 (4.1)
where f(v) is the frequency of occurrence of wind speed v, λ is the scale parameter
which is closely related to the wind speed for the location and β is the dimensionless
shape factor which describes the form and width of the distribution. The value of
β and λ can be determined from following equations [96]:
β = (
σ
v
)−1.086 (4.2)
where σ is the standard deviation. The scale factor has been given as:
λ =
v
Γ(1 +
1
β
)
(4.3)
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where Γ is the gamma function defined mathematically [97]. By determining the
probability of wind speed variations at one time slot, the power attraction from
wind at any time slot t can be expressed as follow:
pw(t) =

0, v ≤ vci, v > vco
Pr
v − vci
vr − vci , vci ≤ v ≤ vr
Pr, vr < v ≤ vco
(4.4)
where vr and Pr are the rated wind speed and rated output power respectively;
vci, vco represent the cut-in and cut-out wind speed respectively. As the speed
increases above the rated output wind speed, to present from damaging the WFs,
a braking system is employed to bring the rotor to a standstill.
4.2.2 The normal distribution model of loads
The power demands from D nodes are assumed to follow the normal distribution:
f(d) =
d
σ
√
2pi
exp[
(d− µ)2
2σ2
] (4.5)
where d is the load, µ is mean value of the load, and σ is the standard deviation.
However, in real situation, load can be forecasted via different methods [98]. Thus,
the load demand of a bus at time t is demoted as d(t). Therefore, the net-power
of a wind generation bus at time t is pw(t) − d(t). Owning to the volatility of
the wind generation and variation of the load, the node may appear either as a G
node, T node or a D node depend on the sign of the net-power.
Vulnerability Analysis: Enhanced Extended Model 72
#1  #2 
#3  #4 
S 
S 
Wind
l1
l2 
l4 
l3 
Figure 4.1: Example of a four bus network with a wind generator
4.2.3 Power transmission capacity
The capacity of a power line l, Pmaxl , determines the maximum amount of power
allowed to pass through the line. Generally the value is time dependent (e.g.
ambient temperature, types of line and ageing of lines). To simplify the analysis,
capacity of lines are assumed to be constant and the line flow limits are designed
from N−1 contingency, meaning that the system is in a secure state with all power
facilities in service and in a satisfactory state under one line trip. The assumption
is made based on the criteria of network planning. The formula is presented as
follows:
Pmaxl = αmax(P
L−n
l ) l, n ∈ L, n 6= l (4.6)
where PL−nl represents the power flow in a line l with a line n removed from
the edge set L and α is the line tolerance parameter. The tolerance parameter
represents the variation of the transmission line capacity affected by operation
temperature, environmental factors (e.g., season, ambient temperature, air hu-
midity, wind speed, wind direction etc) and so on. Fig. 4.1 shows a four-bus
network with two generators [99]. The line MVA ratings are, in order, 1.5 pu, 1.5
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pu, 1 pu and 1 pu and α is set to 1.
4.2.4 Power flows with wind generation
The real power flow on each line l at one time slot t follows:
Pl(t) = |Vi(t)||Vj(t)|[Glcos(θi(t)− θj(t)
+Blsin(θi(t)− θj(t))]
(4.7)
where i, j (i, j ∈ B) are the start and end nodes of line l, |Vi|∠θi, are the voltage
magnitude and angle of the corresponding bus, Gl and Bl are the line conductance
and susceptance respectively. In this chapter, a linearized approximation DC
power flow is adopted base on the following considerations:
1. Most reactive power is generated / absorbed locally which has no big effect
on cascading failure analysis.
2. Assuming the load-shedding mechanism is acting fast enough to avoid the
transient voltage stability issues.
3. Due to the non-linearity and complexity of the AC-power flow analysis, con-
sidering reactive power flow can be computationally difficult.
The DC power flow model is shown as:
Pl(t) = Bl(θi(t)− θj(t)) (4.8)
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where the voltage magnitude |Vi(t)| is assumed to be one at all the time, line
conductance is assumed to be zero and the angle difference is assumed to be small
enough such that the following equation satisfied sin(θi(t)− θj(t)) = θi(t)− θj(t).
To maintain the stability and reliability operation of the power grid, the power
flow on each line need to remain under its capacity limit:
|Pl(t)| < Pmaxl l ∈ L (4.9)
Due to the non-dispatchable characteristic of WFs, in DC power flow the conven-
tional generators and WFs should be treated differently. This dispatch problem
can be formulated as a constrained optimization problem which is shown as
min(εccg(t) + ζc
w
g (t)) (4.10)
where ccg and c
w
g are the total power generation from conventional generators and
WFs respectively at time t; ε and ζ are the generation cost of the two generation
types. In this chapter, the generation cost of wind power generation is ignored
(ζ = 0) since renewable energy law regulate that all of the generated power must
be adopted [100]. The generation costs are set equally for conventional generators.
4.3 Enhanced Extended Model
To investigate the system vulnerability over different time t, a day can be divided
into τ time slots (t ∈ [1, 2, . . . , τ ]). Power generations and loads are dynamically
changing over time, however, in each discrete time slot the values are assumed to
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Table 4.1: PTDFs of the example four bus network
Lines Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 4
l1 0 -0.7325 -0.1975 -0.5350
l2 0 -0.2675 -0.8025 -0.4650
l3 0 0.2675 -0.1975 -0.5350
l4 0 -0.2675 0.1975 -0.4650
be constant. Based on the power complex network provided in previous sections,
a extended vulnerability model is proposed. The model includes the following im-
portant concepts: power transfer distribution factor, power line transfer capacity,
line betweenness and net-ability.
4.3.1 Power transfer distribution factors
Power transfer distribution factors (PTDFs) [101] reflect the sensitivity of power
flow change in each line for power injection/withdrawal at a pair of nodes. Thus,
PTDFs can be expressed as a matrix F with dimension of NL × NB, where NL
and NB represent number of edges and nodes respectively. In F , each element Plj
expresses the power flow changes in line l with a unit power injection at node j
and withdrawal at the reference node, where l ∈ L and j ∈ B. Here, the reference
node can be an arbitrary node in the node set. The power flow applied here refers
to DC power flow involving wind generation as shown in section II D. The PTDFs
of a four-node reference network (Fig. 4.1) is listed in Table 4.1 and shows the
power change in four lines with unit power injection at node 2, 3, 4 and withdrawal
from reference node 1. The meaning of the generation shift factor of −0.27 for
bus 2 and line l2 is that an injection of 1 MW at bus 2 and −1 MW at bus 1 will
decrease the flow on line l2 by 0.27 MW.
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Since power can only be transmitted from generators to loads, the power flow
variation in a particular line l with power injection at a generator g and withdrawal
at a load d can be represented with following equation:
P gdl = Plg − Pld, g ∈ G, d ∈ D (4.11)
dim{P gdl } = NL× (NG ·ND), where NG, ND represent the number of G nodes and
D nodes respectively. Take Fig. 4.1 as a example, the size of P gdl is 4 × 3. It
is important to note that P gdl can be either positive or negative and depends on
the pre-defined line direction. Furthermore, the values of P gdl are sensitive to the
changes of the network topology but insensitive to power generation or demand
variations.
4.3.2 Power line transfer capacity
In a power grid, the maximum power flow in each line is limited by its power
transmission capacity determined from section II C. In order to maintain the sta-
bility and security of the network, loading of power lines, P reall (t), are constrained
to their limits that is |P reall (t)| < Pmaxl . The remaining line margins at time slot
t are determined as Ml(t) = P
max
l − |P reall (t)|.
Generally, for lower the Ml(t) values, the higher stress on the network and more
likely cascading failures occurring, especially in case of any unforeseen catastrophic
events. e.g. power networks are more vulnerable in peak hour t (Ml(t) is low) than
in off-peak hour t
′
(Ml(t
′
) is high). The total transfer capacity from any G node
g to any D node d is limited by the minimum line transfer capacity (Ml(t)/|P gdl |)
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Table 4.2: Power transfer capacities of the example network
C21 C
3
1 C
2
4 C
3
4
1.0475 1.3275 1.3097 0.8979
Table 4.3: Line betweenness of the example network
l1 l2 l3 l4
1.343 1.519 1.639 1.263
as shown below:
Cgd(t) = min
l∈L
(
Ml(t)
|P gdl |
)
Ml(t) ≥ 0 (4.12a)
Cdg (t) = min(C
gd(t),max(g)) (4.12b)
where Cgd(t) is determined as amount of power can be injected to the generator
g and withdrawal from the load d at time slot t without exceeding the line MVA
ratings, max(g) is maximum net power generation from a G node g. The formula
indicates that Cdg (t) is sensitive to both a change of network topology (P
gd
l ) and
variation of demand (Ml). Table 4.2 lists the total power transfer capacity of any
pair of G nodes and D nodes, in which C31 gives highest value.
4.3.3 Line betweenness
As mentioned above, Cdg indicates the amount of power that can be transferred
between an arbitrary generator g and an arbitrary load d when the margin of an
arbitrary line l reaches zero. Thus, the maximum amount of power flow through
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an individual line l at time t can be expressed as Cdg (t)P
gd
l (t). Then, the total
power flowing though a line l is:
T+l (t) =
∑
g∈G
∑
d∈D
Cdg (t)P
gd
l (t) P
gd
l (t) > 0 (4.13a)
T−l (t) =
∑
g∈G
∑
d∈D
Cdg (t)P
gd
l (t) P
gd
l (t) < 0 (4.13b)
Algorithm 2 Cascading Failure Simulator
Require: A connected graph E={B,L,W} and the initial edge failure event Lb, Lr ∈ L,
where Lb and Lr represent the line with highest and lowest line betweenness respec-
tively. DC power flow algorithm which considers non-dispatchable wind generation.
1: while Total generation > 0 do
2: step 1: Trip Lb (or Lr for low-betweenness attacks) and update the network
topology;
3: step 2: Recalculate the power flow (Algorithm 2);
4: while Line overloaded or network isolated do
5: step 3: Trip overloaded or isolated lines and
6: buses;
7: step 4: Recalculate the power flow (Algorithm 2);
8: step 5: Recalculate PTDFs of the remaining
9: network;
10: step 6: Determine the net-ability ratio and update line
11: Lb (or Lr for low-betweenness attacks);
Algorithm 3 Power Dispatch and load shedding
Require: The required parameters at time t are denoted as: total power generation
= GT ; total power consumption =LD; total wind generation = GW ; capacity of
conventional generation Gmax.
1: while GT 6= LD do
2: if GT > LD then
3: if GW > LD then Shed wind generation and load to match the demand
4: else Adjust conventional generation to match the demand
5: if GT < LD then
6: if Gmax +GW < LD then Shed load to match the supply
7: else Adjust conventional generator to match the demand
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These equations accumulate the power flow of two directions (positive and nega-
tive) in an arbitrary line from all pairs of generators and loads. The line between-
ness is defined as the maximum absolute value which is shown below [102]:
Tl(t) = max
[|T+l (t)|, |T−l (t)|] (4.14)
In a network, a line with higher the line betweenness meaning that it is more
critical than others. In the example of Fig. 4.1, following the above equations,
the line betweenness is presented in Table 4.3 and in which l3 has the highest
betweenness.
4.3.4 Net-ability
For a grid network, the net-ability evaluates how well the power grid supplies
power to the load which can be expressed as [101]. The existing net-ability mea-
surement was only designed for static networks without considering the variability
of load and generation in the network. In this chapter, an enhanced time-varying
net-ability is designed and takes both load variability and non-dispatchable wind
generation into consideration. The method is formulated as follows:
E(t) =
1
NGND
∑
g∈G
∑
d∈D
Cdg (t)
Zdg (t)
(4.15)
where NG, ND are the number of generators and loads in the network, Z
d
g is the
equivalent impedance between an arbitrary generator g and load d pair which can
be interpreted as the difficulty to transfer the relevant quantity between generator
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node g and load d in the network. At arbitrary time t, the equivalent impedance
between node G and D is denoted as Zdg (t). It is important to note that Z
d
g (t)
remains constant at normal operation but changes along with varying of network
structure (line trips during cascading failure) and nodes type (change from G/D
node to D/G nodes). Thus, Cdg/Z
d
g can be explained as the efficiency of delivering
Cdg amount of power from node g to node d at time t. According to electrical
circuit theory the equivalent impedance can be calculated as:
Zdg =
Udg
Ig
= zgg − 2zgd + zdd (4.16)
where Udg is the voltage difference between two buses; Ig is the current injected at
bus g and withdrawn from bus d; zgd is the g-th, d-th element of the impedance
matrix.
Furthermore, for the purposes of exploring the net-ability over different network
topologies (due to cascading failure), the parameter is normalized based on the
network’s Emax, such that:
R(t) =
E(t)
Emax
(4.17)
where R(t) is the net-ability ratio, Emax is the maximum net-ability of a given
network which occurs when Ml = P
max
l . In the Fig. 4.1 example, the net-ability
ratio of the network is 18.65/34.47 = 0.54.
4.3.5 Vulnerability assessment
To verify the proposed method of identifying vulnerable lines in power networks,
a cascading failure simulator (shown in algorithm 1) is developed to simulate the
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collapse of power network under both low and high-betweenness attacks. Low-
betweenness attacks refer to the failure or fault on any of the less important
lines. On the contrary, high-betweenness attacks refer to failure or attack (from
hacking, etc.) of critical lines. The attacking process starts with the line of
highest (or lowest) betweenness depending on the attack types. The rank of line
betweenness can be determined from previous sections. If a line is attacked, it
will be removed from the network and the carried load will be redistributed to
other lines. During the procedures, any overloaded or isolated (disconnected from
any generators after line attacks) segments need to be further removed from the
network which may lead to further collapse in the network. Meanwhile, load
shedding and power dispatch algorithms are required to bring the network back
to normal operation status. After each attack, power line transfer capacity and
the equivalent impedance net-ability ratio will be recalculated to determine the
new rank of line tripping. During the attack procedures, if the network collapses
into two or multiple isolated networks, each network will be analyzed individually
following the same method. The attacking process terminates when no generators
are available.
4.4 Simulation Results
This section demonstrates the application of the methodology explained in the
previous section to identify the vulnerability of different power networks. Case I
investigates how system net-ability changing with total load demands. Then, the
system net-ability versus lines capacity setting is analyzed. Due to the volatility
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Figure 4.2: Case I: (a) Line betweenness versus demand verification in IEEE 14 bus
system. (b) Net-ability versus demand verification with different tolerance parameters
in IEEE 14 bus system.
characteristics of wind, the power generation from wind farms may change signif-
icantly in short period of time. In Case II, wind generations are formulated as
Weibull distribution and loads are modeled as normal distribution to study the
effect of wind generation on system vulnerability. In Case III, real load and wind
data are adopted to investigate power networks cascading failure.
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Figure 4.3: Case II: (a) Example of IEEE 14 network with wind generation. Blue and
red line indicates the total power demand and wind generation at 50 different samples
respectively. (b) The corresponding net-ability ratio for each sample point shown in
(a). The line colors represent the different wind farm locations.
4.4.1 Case I: Net-ability versus load variation
IEEE 14 bus system structure [103] is adopted for this analysis which is composed
of two G nodes (bus 1 and bus 3), two T nodes (bus 7 and 8), and twelve D
nodes. First, the capacity of individual power line Pmaxl is identified as mentioned
in section II C. Here, the line tolerance parameter is set to one (α = 1). Then,
following enhanced extended model processes, the line betweenness and net-power
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ratio for the network can be identified. Finally, changing the total power demands
uniformly and check the response from lines betweenness and net-ability.
Fig. 4.2a demonstrates the line betweenness with total demands varying from
−40% to 40%. It can be seen that the betweenness of lines follows the same trend
which reduces gradually with increasing of loads before experience a dramatic
drop. The fundamental cause of the trend lies on the reduce of the power transfer
capacity in each line due to the increasing of the power demand. Furthermore,
the sensitivity difference of power flow change in each power line determines the
betweenness of some of the edges, e.g. l1,2, l2,4, l5,6 decrease much quicker than
other lines. Therefore, when the system is under-loaded (e.g. when the power
demand is −40%) the importance of lines are distinct, when the line betweenness
is higher this indicates the more importance of the line. On the other hand, when
the system is heavy loaded (e.g. when the demand is 40%), all lines are stressed
and trip off an arbitrary line may lead to cascading failure.
To further investigate the network properties, the net-ability versus demand vari-
ation with different line tolerance parameters are plotted in Fig. 4.2b. At α = 1,
the dramatic drop of net-ability ratio appears when demand verification equals to
approximately 25% which matches with Fig. 4.2a. An increase (or decrease of α
could potentially extend (or shorten) the required total load demand causing the
system net-ability suddenly falling. When α = 0.8, the system net-ability radio
reaches zero (line drops) when demand exceeds 10%.
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Figure 4.4: Case III: Real power demands in 24 hours. (a-d), categories the demands
into four different patterns.
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4.4.2 Case II: System net-ability ratio versus wind generations
To investigate the effect of wind generation on power network vulnerability, in this
section, 50 sample points are set up and the power demands and wind generations
at each point are shown in Fig. 4.3a. The power demand follows normal distri-
bution (for the purpose of illustration) with mean µ = 25 and standard deviation
σ = 10. Wind generations are formulated with Weibull distribution with scale
parameter λ = 7 and shape factor β = 2. To simplify the analysis, in this case,
loads at each bus are assumed to be uniformly varying. It is clear that at most
samples, the power generations from wind are less than the power required. It is
important to note that due to the lack of an energy storage system when the wind
generations are greater than the demand, the additional power is absorbed by the
slack bus to balance the flow.
Fig. 4.3b shows the net-ability changes for each sample points. Overall, the
net-ability ratio reduces with increasing of total power demand which matches
with the discussion in previous section. However, locations of connecting the
wind generators also affect the network vulnerability. The figure provides three
connection scenarios which are colored in blue, red and green respectively. In
scenario 1 and 2, wind generations are either connected to D nodes which have
relatively low demand or T nodes. The results show that the system experience
line trips at multiple sample points. The power generated from the wind farms are
only partially used locally, most of them are delivered all the way to the demand
locations which stress the system. In scenario 3, most wind power are consumed
locally, therefore, the system does not experience line trips.
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At each sample, the net-load profile is calculated by subtracting total wind gen-
eration from the total load profile. When net load is positive, additional power is
required from patchable power resources, e.g., thermal and hydroelectric genera-
tion. On the other hand, when wind generation is greater than the total power
consumption (e.g., sample 21 and 35) additional controllable loads need to be used
to balance the supply. In this chapter, slack buses are assumed to have capability
of absorbing a certain amount of additional power generated from wind. When a
slack bus fails to balance the supply, wind generation and load shedding will take
place.
4.4.3 Case III: Cascading failure analysis
This section demonstrates the application of the methodology explained in the
previous section to identify the variation of system vulnerabilities over changing
of power demands and power generation from wind farms in 24 hours. Then, the
networks with the highest and the lowest net-ability ratios in that time frame are
selected for cascading failure analysis. The simulations are done with MATLAB R©
and toolbox Matpower.
First, the IEEE 30 bus system [103], is modeled based on the principles defined in
earlier sections. The network involves 30 nodes (6 G nodes in which node 23 and
node 27 are wind generations, 7 T nodes and 17 D nodes) and 41 edges. To verify
the feasibility of the method for assessing the power network vulnerability, example
real power demand data and example real wind speed data are adopted. Fig. 4.4
shows the variation of load demands in 24 hours with 10 minutes time interval.
Overall, the power demands can be classified into four different usage patterns
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Figure 4.5: Case III: (a) Total power demand and total generation in 24 hours with
10 minutes time interval. (b) The corresponding net-ability ratio at each time slot.
Results of low-betweenness and betweenness attacks on the network with highest (c)
and lowest (d) net-ability ratio.
which are formed by the combinations of different residential and industrial power
usages.
Next, the cumulated power demands and wind generations in a day are shown
in Fig. 4.5a. Here, the wind energy penetration which is the percentage of de-
mand covered by wind energy in a certain region is approximately 16%. Then,
the enhanced extended model is applied to identify the vulnerability of the system
at each time step which is plotted in Fig. 4.5b. It can be seen clearly that the
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net-ability ratio of the network is not static but fluctuate significantly with chang-
ing of loads and generations. Overall, the robustness of the network has inverse
relationship with the total power demands which matches with the expectation.
Furthermore, the highest value appears at 2:50 (Tmax) when the total demand is
low but the wind generation is relatively high. At this point, power from these
wind farms meets the local demands which in turn release the stresses of the lines.
On the other hand, at time (e.g. Tmin at 11:10) when the system experiences high
demand but low wind generation, the network becomes very vulnerable.
Finally, Fig.4.5 c and d demonstrate the attack results of the networks at time
Tmax and Tmin respectively. It can be observed that the network is robust to low-
betweenness attacks but vulnerable to betweenness attacks, e.g. in Fig. 4.5c, the
system tolerates only 7 high-betweenness attacks before finally collapsing com-
pared to 17 low-betweenness attacks which achieve the same result. Furthermore,
the net-ability ratio of a network at time t determines its vulnerability level at
that time. Higher the value, more robust the network is in terms of preventing
from cascading failure.
4.4.4 Case IV: Net-ability versus high wind generation
Generally, the penetration of renewable energy in a network has to be below than
certain level to maintain the system stability and reliability. However, there are
some cases when wind generation is high but the power consumption is extremely
low. In that case, additional controllable sources or sinks for power need to be
used to control the system frequency. The conventional generators or even wind
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Figure 4.6: IEEE 118 bus power network.
generators may be turn off when the system cannot balance the power supply with
the power consumption.
In this section, the IEEE 118 bus system [103] is adopted to investigate the impact
of high wind generation to the network vulnerability. Fig.4.6 shows the layout of
IEEE 118 bus power network which contains 118 nodes (19 G nodes 10 T nodes,
89 D nodes) and 41 edges. In the figure, the nodes 10, 25, 26, 49, 54, 65 and 80
are set as wind generators which are marked in green, the other generators are
colored in yellow. The penetration levels of wind generators are scaled as 50%,
100% and 140% of total power demand. When the wind generators provide 50%
of total demand, the remaining load are supplied by conventional generators. As
the wind generation continues to increase, power supply from wind matches with
the power demand, and then the conventional generators will be turned off. When
the generation from wind is greater than the total demand, one way of balancing
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Table 4.4: Top ten vulnerable lines ranking for IEEE 118 bus system with different
wind generations
Line Ranking 50% 100% 140% 1 140% 2
1 65-68 65-68 8-30 65-68
2 8-30 68-69 65-68 8-9
3 68-69 8-30 8-5 9-10
4 30-38 30-38 26-25 68-69
5 8-9 8-5 30-38 30-38
6 9-10 38-65 30-17 8-5
7 8-5 26-25 65-66 8-30
8 23-25 23-25 35-65 23-24
9 23-24 23-24 68-69 23-25
10 38-65 8-9 23-25 38-65
net-ability
ratio
0.82 0.78 0.73 0.77
the additional supply is to switch on additional resistive load. In this chapter, the
slack bus (bus 69) has capability of absorbing additional supply. Another method
relies on turning off enough wind generation and turning on some conventional
generators to eliminate the demand-supply mismatch. During the simulation, the
following key assumptions are made: 1) loads are constant; 2) capacities of lines are
high enough to handle these scenarios; 3) conventional generators can be switched
on simultaneously to balance the demand when necessary.
Table 4.4 shows the top 10 vulnerable lines and net-ability ratio under different
penetration levels. The 140% wind penetration is considered using two differen-
t methods and shown in column 4 and 5 respectively. It is clear that the line
vulnerability in the network varies with the wind penetration level. This is be-
cause the remaining line margins of an arbitrary line l, Ml, changes under different
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scenarios. Furthermore, the net-ability ratio decreases for increasing of wind pen-
etration levels, from 0.82 at 50% drop to 0.73 at 140%. Moreover, different supply
balancing methods at high energy penetration leads to different net-ability ratios.
This is owning to increased power flow in the network caused by new additional
load. Examining the (140% 1) case, all the new loads that are located on the slack
bus cause more power flow to the bus. For the 140% 2 case, the wind generation
shedding method avoids additional power flow but requires the conventional gen-
erators to supply additional resistive load. After generation shedding, the wind
penetration level reduces back to 95% of the total load.
4.5 Summary
This chapter has proposed an enhanced extended model which takes time vary-
ing net-ability ratio as a centrality index to assess vulnerable components in a
contemporary power network. Meanwhile, the method takes intermittent wind
generations into consideration. The method considers intermittent wind genera-
tion. By examining the net-ability in this way, the case studies determine that
different distribution of load and wind generation may lead to different vulnerabil-
ity levels. The same method is suitable for networks with combination of different
renewable types. Furthermore, the erratic natures of volatile renewable sources
introduce fluctuation in the power production and could potentially switch the di-
rection of power flow as well as affect the network robustness. Especially for some
of the networks which heavily rely on volatile renewable energy source, e.g. South
Australia power network, low or zero wind generations at peak demands could sig-
nificantly increase the burden of the network which in turn increases the incidence
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of cascading failure. Thus, proper monitoring and protection of vulnerable lines
are necessary to prevent from cascading failure.
Chapter 5
Effective Augmentation of
Complex Network
5.1 Overview
This chapter proposed a new algorithm to expand a complex network in a way such
that the minimum number of driver nodes required to achieve full structure control
of the network remains the same. Section 5.2 gives some examples of network
expansion in real networks. Section 5.3 provides a augmentation in trivial cases.
The effective augmentation approach is proposed in section 5.4 and the maximum
augmentable nodes is shown in section 5.5. The feasibility of the proposed method
is applied in multiple synthetic networks (section 5.6), real networks (section 5.7).
Section 5.8 concludes the chapter with discussions.
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a
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Figure 5.1: Example of 57 nodes network augmentation. (a) A directed net-
work with fifty-seven nodes can be controlled via a minimum of eleven driver nodes (ND
=11) coloured in blue. (b) The network in (a) is now augmented by eight independent
source nodes and two sink nodes, and are displayed as triangles. The new network can
still be fully controlled via ND =11 drivers.
5.2 Preliminaries
The present work analyses the addition of nodes having only a single edge so that
they are either source nodes (having zero in-degree kin = 0) or sink nodes (having
zero out-degree kout = 0). Figure 5.1a provides an example of a 57 node network
that can be fully controlled with ND =11. In Fig. 5.1b, the network in Fig. 5.1a
is augmented by using our method and adding 10 new nodes (shown in triangles
which includes 8 source nodes and 2 sink nodes) while ND=11 remains unchanged.
However, had these ten nodes been augmented randomly, it is highly unlikely that
ND would remain constant, and conceivably ND could have increased by as much
as ten.
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5.3 Augmentation in Trivial Cases
Augmentation refers to connecting new nodes to an existing network in a certain
manner such that the minimum number of driver nodes (ND) required to achieve
full control of the network is conserved without change. According to minimum
inputs theorem as described in Section II, for an arbitrary directed network G(A),
ND can be determined as following:
ND = max(N − |M∗|, 1) (5.1)
where A ∈ RN×N , is the state matrix of the network, N is the total number of
nodes, |M∗| denotes the size of maximum matching, N − |M∗| gives the number
of unmatched nodes in the maximum matching of G(A). If the network is fully
matched, then N = |M∗| and ND=1.
It is always possible to connect a new source node to an existing driver node
without changing ND. This is a basic result from structural control theory based
on the stem/cactus structure of the network [27]. Thus adding source nodes to the
current driver nodes is considered a trivial solution to the augmentation problem,
and therefore will not discuss in depth or make use of in this chapter. Similarly
adding a sink node to a terminal node should be considered as a trivial solution to
the augmentation problem. Hence, the main goal of the chapter is encapsulated
in the following questions: How can one add source nodes to an existing network
other than to the current driver nodes (the trivial solution), while ensuring ND
remains unchanged? Similarly how can one add sink nodes in a non-trivial way
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under the same constraint? And is it possible to find multiple solutions that can
accomplish the same goal?
In general it is important to determine many possible solutions to the augmen-
tation problem. The main advantage of having multiple solutions to choose from
is: with different applications, new nodes might need to be connected to quite
different positions in the network in order to take into account spatial constraints.
The position may need to be selected from a set of possible solutions based on the
modified network’s reliability, stability, vulnerability etc.. For example, adding
ten new nodes (substations, load, and buses) to a power network, in a way that
minimises cost, maximises system reliability while ensuring ND is unchanged. Our
methodology finds multiple combinations of nodes other than the trivial existing
drivers to connect to. Naturally, there is always the option of connecting to the
existing drivers (i.e., the trivial solution).
Network augmentation via the addition of edge connections rather than adding
nodes has previously been examined from the controllability perspective [33, 104,
105]. In these studies, augmentation was implemented by only adding new edges,
with the aim of decreasing ND and therefore enhancing controllability. However,
the growth of networks involves not only increasing the number of edges but also
the number of nodes. For example, in a supply chain network [106], new storage
warehouses (nodes) may need to be built in order to meet gradually increasing
commodity demands. To our knowledge, currently there are no publications that
address the augmentation of nodes to a network subject to controllability con-
straints, as is the goal of our work here.
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5.4 Effective Augmentation Method
5.4.1 Node classification
Definition 5.1. (Minimum Driver node Set & Minimum Terminal node Set) In a
bipartite represented maximum matching, the set of unmatched nodes is referred to
as the Minimum Driver node Set (MDS). Correspondingly, denote the Minimum
Terminal node Set (MTS) as the set of unmatched nodes in the maximum matching
of its transpose network. An example is shown in Fig.2.6 where MDS={V2, V5}
and MTS={V1, V4}.
To explore source augmentation, the consequence of connecting a single source
test node to any node x in an arbitrary directed network G(A) is examined,
where A ∈ <N×N is the state matrix and N is total number of nodes. The node x
is defined as follow: i) Source Invariant (SI) if ND does not change, and ii) Source
Redundant (SR) if ND increases. Obviously all driver nodes in a network are SI.
Thus, in the example of Fig. 5.2a, nodes 1, 2, 3 are SI. Adding a source node
to any of these nodes leaves ND unchanged (Fig. 5.2b). Nodes 4 and 5 are SR
(Fig. 5.2c).
Similarly, for sink augmentation, it is useful to examine what happens when a sink
test node is added to any node x in the network (Fig. 5.3b). Node x can be defined
as: i) Sink Invariant (KI) if ND remains unchanged (e.g., node 2, 3, 5 in Fig. 5.3c);
ii) Sink Redundant (KR) if ND increases. It is easy to prove that source nodes are
always SI and sink nodes are KI. Then, NSI +NSR = N , NKI +NKR = N where
NSI , NSR, NKI and NKR are the number of nodes of each type. It is important
to prove that a network’s full set of SI nodes is the union of all nodes in every
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possible MDS. Similarly, full set of KI nodes is the union of all nodes in every
possible MTS.
Theorem 5.2. (The set of SI nodes of an arbitrary directed network G(A) is the
union of all nodes in every possible MDS.) Theorem 1 is equivalent to the following
two statements: i) Any node Vi in G(A) is an SI node if it is a member of at least
one possible MDS. ii) Vi is SR if it is not a member of any MDS.
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Figure 5.2: Node Classification of a small network for source augmenta-
tion. (a) A directed network with five nodes can be controlled via minimum of two
driver nodes determined from maximum matching (MDS={1,3}). The driver nodes are
coloured in blue and the matching edges are marked in red. (b) For sources augmen-
tation, nodes are categorized into SI and SR nodes. Node 2 is an SI node since ND
remains unchanged after connecting a new test source node STest to it. (c) The same
method determines that node 4 is SR. Thus, SI nodes {1,2,3} are marked in red and
SR nodes are {4,5} coloured in yellow.
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Figure 5.3: Node Classification of a small network for sink augmentation.
The same network a nodes are divided into KI and KR for sink augmentation. (b)
Connecting an independent sink node KTest to node 2 and 4 respectively, reveals that
node 2 is KI (ND = 2) and node 4 is KR (ND = 3). The categories are shown in (c)
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Proof: Statement i) If Vi belongs to at least one MDS, then there exists at least
one maximum matching solution such that Vi is unmatched. Connecting a new test
source node to an unmatched node will not affect the total number of unmatched
nodes (i.e., drivers). Thus, according to node classification, Vi is an SI node.
Proof: Statement ii) If Vi is not a member of any MDS, then it never needs to be
controlled. Connect a test source node VS to Vi and assume the new augmented
network is still structurally controllable with the same ND. Since source node VS
has no incoming edges, it is always needs to be controlled. Hence, remove VS from
the network, the remaining network (G(A)) should be fully controlled with ND − 1
driver nodes. This leads to a contradiction. Then, our assumption fails, and the
number of drivers ND required to fully control the new network increases when the
test node is added to Vi. Hence, Vi is an SR node.
Theorem 5.3. (The set of KI nodes of a directed network G(V,E) is the union
of all nodes in every possible MTS.)
Proof: The concepts introduced in Theorem 5.2 hold for this theorem. Denote
G(AT ) as a directed network with transposed state matrix AT . Then, the MTS of
G(A) is the MDS of G(AT ). Hence, Theorem 2 is equivalent to proving theorem
1 with the new network G(AT ).
In node classification process, one node may appear both SI and KI depends on
the network topology. Theses nodes are important for effective augmentation.
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Figure 5.4: Example of SI network. (a) A directed network with eighteen nodes
can be controlled via the MDS={6,12,13,14} which is determined by maximum match-
ing and coloured in blue. By applying the node classification algorithm, the nodes are
divided into different categories: SI nodes (non-drivers) {1,3,4,5,7,15} are red (drivers
are always SI), and SR nodes {2,8,9,10,11,16,17,18} are yellow. (b) The SI network
is determined by removing all incoming edges to every SR node (yellow) while the
outgoing edges remain. This makes the V-motifs easy to identify.
5.4.2 SI and KI network
To locate all clusters, it is necessary to first simplify the network by forming the
so-called ‘SI-network’, which is easier to work with. The SI-network is obtained
by first locating all SR nodes and then removing all of their incoming edges (i.e.,
setting kSRin = 0). This procedure fragments the original network. The connected
network that remains is defined as the SI network, since it contains all SI-nodes,
as shown in Fig. 5.4b.
Different from SI network, the ‘KI network’ is determined by removing all outgoing
edges from every KR node while the incoming edges remain. This is because the
fact that connecting a sink node to a KR node will increase ND.
It is clear that for a same network can be simplified into two networks: SI and KI
network depend on the applications.
Effective Augmentation of Complex Network 102
16
3
13
12
15
6
4
17
10
9
2
7
11
14
5
1
8
18
16
3
13
12
15
6
4
17
10
9
2
7
11
14
5
1
8
18
Terminal Node KI Node KR Node
a  b KI Network
Figure 5.5: Example of KI network. (a) By applying our node classification
algorithm, nodes are divided into different categories: KI nodes (non-terminal nodes)
{3,5,6} are red and KR nodes {1,4,7,8,10,11,12,13,14,16,18} are yellow. Terminal nodes
are shown in cyan. (b) The ‘KI network’ is determined by removing all outgoing edges
from every KR node (yellow) while the incoming edges remain.
5.4.3 The V-motif
Find V-motif in SI network
The simplest and most elementary cluster of SI-nodes possible is referred to as a
”V-motif” and is the basis for clusters of all types. Figure 5.6a, displays a typical
V-motif in the SI-network for the nodes R1 → {L1, L2}, where root-node R1 points
to two and only two leaf nodes L1 and L2. The nodes {L1, L2} form an elementary
SI cluster as long as any one of the nodes is a driver.
This two-node cluster has the fundamental property that its two constituent nodes
L1 and L2 cannot both be drivers and thus can never participate in the same
MDS. The property can be inferred from a simple maximum matching of the V-
motif. (if an independent source node ‘S’ is augmented to L2, then every node
of the SI cluster becomes matched (Fig. 5.6c) and thus all nodes in the cluster
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Figure 5.6: V-motifs in SI networks. (a-c) A demonstration of the simplest SI
cluster and its features. (a) The prototypical V-motif in source augmentation consists
of one root node (SI or SR) pointing to two SI leaves {L1, L2}. Nodes L1, a driver,
and L2 form the simplest SI cluster. For example, when an independent source node
‘S’ connects to L2 (b), both L1 and L2 become SR. This can be well explained with
maximum bipartite matching of the structure (c), where both leaves become always
matched. Furthermore, node ‘S’ replace L1 and becomes the new driver node (become
unmatched in the -set). (d) A node configuration that has no cluster since it has no V-
motif. (e) Here nodes L1, L2 and L3 form a cluster being correlated via two intersecting
V-motifs. (f), similar forms of four-nodes cluster via three intersecting V-motifs.
{L1, L2} change to SR nodes (Fig. 5.6b). The new node ‘S’ become unmatched
and replaces L1 as the new driver node. Hence ND remains conserved.) Moreover
for other isolated motifs of the form, say, R1→ {L1, L2, L3} (Fig. 5.6d) which is
not a V-motif, maximum matching shows that the nodes L1, L2, L3 lack the above
fundamental property.
Building on the example of the V-motifs, it is possible to obtain three-node clusters
and multiple-node clusters etc., each of which has the same fundamental property:
there can only be one driver node within any cluster. Figure 5.6e gives an example
of a three-node cluster (grey region) obtained from two intersecting V-motifs. Here
root-node R1 points to leaves L1 and L2 while root-node R2 points to leaves L2
and L3. The set of SI nodes L1, L2 and L3 form a cluster if any one of these nodes
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is a driver. Figure 5.6f gives an example of a four-node cluster obtained from three
intersecting V-motifs.
For networks with different types and varying degree distributions, V-motifs can
become entangled in the SI network but may nevertheless be identified by these
methods. For example, in Fig.5.7a, the root node R1 → {L1, L2} is a V-motif but
R2 → {L1, L2, L3} is not. From studying maximal matching solutions, a simple
rule emerges that allows us to accommodate such special cases. In this case L1 and
L2 can be treated as a merged composite node C1 = {L1, L2}. Then the structure
R2 → {L1, L2, L3} can be collapsed to R2 → {C1, L3}, which should be viewed
as a V-motif. Thus {L1, L2, L3} forms a cluster. Maximum matching shows this
three node set has the same fundamental property of clusters. Fig.5.7b shows a
similar configuration to Fig.5.7a, for which there are no clusters of any type. This
is because R1 and R2 are not root nodes of any V-motif. With the same procedure,
in Fig.5.7c, the V-motif can be identified as R1→ {L1, L2}. Nodes L1 and L2 can
be merged to form the composite node C1 = {L1, L2}. Nodes L3 and L4 can also
be merged as a composite node C2 = {L3, L4}. Then, R2 → {L1, L2, L3, L4} is
equivalent to R2 → {C1, C2} which is a V-motif.
Find V-motifs in KI network
Searching V-motifs in KI network can be slightly different from finding from SI
network. Figure 5.8a, displays a typical V-motif in the KI-network for the nodes
{R1, R2} → L1, where root-nodes R1 and R2 point to one and only one leaf node
L1. The nodes {R1, R2} forms an elementary KI cluster as long as any one of the
nodes is a terminal node.
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Figure 5.7: More example of V-motifs in SI networks (a) A more complex
three-node cluster, where R1 → {L1, L2} is a V-motif but R2 → {L1, L2, L3} is not.
{L1, L2, L3} forms a cluster which is shown by the grey shading. (b) Shows a similar
configuration to a, for which there are no clusters of any type. (c) An example of a
complex four-node cluster.
This two-node cluster has the fundamental property that its two constituent nodes
R1 and R2 cannot be terminal nodes and thus can never participate in the same
MTS. This can be proved from a simple maximum matching. Following the same
principle, it is possible to obtain three-node (Fig 5.8b) and multiple nodes clusters
(Fig 5.8d). Again for networks with different types, V-motifs in KI network can
become entangled. Fig 5.8d demonstrates a more complicated forms of V-motifs.
5.4.4 Identifying SI and KI cluster
To expedite finding SI clusters it is helpful to first form the corresponding SI
network defined as the remaining connected sub-graphs found after removing all
incoming edges to all SR nodes. The identification of SI clusters is then achieved
through a sequential process of searching for V-motifs. The search begins with
low out-degree nodes and ends with nodes having highest out-degree. The process
makes use of cluster merging. Two clusters (sets of nodes) can be merged into
one if: i) the two clusters appear as two distinct leaves of a V-motif; ii) the two
clusters contain one or more common nodes. The detailed procedure is as follows:
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Figure 5.8: Determining KI clusters via V-motifs in KI networks (a-d) Frag-
mented sub-graphs in KI networks. The KI nodes are correlated as roots in a ‘V-motif’
or in multiple ‘V-motifs’ that lie in the KI network. (a) A prototypical V-motif for
sink augmentation is comprised of one leaf node and is pointed to by two root nodes
(KI nodes). The two root nodes (R1, R2) are considered as a KI cluster since: i) R1
is a terminal node; ii) two KI nodes are correlated via a V-motif and no other KI n-
odes are correlated to this terminal node. (b) R1, R2, R3 are connected via two serial
V-motifs and therefore, {R1, R2, R3} is a KI cluster. (c-d) More complicated forms of
V-motifs. (c) {R1, R2} → L1 is a V-motif, thus, C1 = {R1, R2} can be considered as
a composite node. Then, a new V-motif forms as {C1, R3} → L2. Since no other KI
nodes are involved, thus, {R1, R2, R3} is a KI cluster. (d) Using the same concept,
{R1, R2, R3, R4} can be classified as a KI cluster.
(1) Search the SI network for all nodes having out-degree equal two (kout = 2).
If there are no nodes with kout=2 in the SI network there can be no clusters.
Each identified node is the root node of a prototypical V-motif, and the two
nodes connected to the root are leaves. Being part of the SI network, they must
both be SI. From here on, treat both of these SI nodes as a merged cluster.
Multiple clusters are merged if they meet the above merging conditions i) or ii).
For example, from the V-motifs in Fig. 5.9a, the sets of SI nodes {14, 1}, {1, 5}
and {5, 7} are considered as three clusters (merge condition i). The clusters can
be further merged together as {1, 5, 7, 14} (merge condition ii).
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Figure 5.9: Effective source augmentation of a small network. (a) Multiple
V-motifs are identified . They are: 10 → {14, 1}, 4 → {14, 5}, 12 → {5, 7}, 14 →
{12, 3}, 18 → {3, 15}. Then, based on the V-motifs, two SI clusters {1,5,7,14} and
{3,12,15} are identified. Note that, the structure 1 → {15, 4, 6} is not a V-motif since
it involves more than two groups. However, when removing all finalised clusters, 1 →
{4, 6} become a V-motif and {4,6} is a new SI cluster. (b) To verify the features
of clusters, three independent source nodes are augmented to each cluster, S1 → 1,
S2 → 3, S3 → 4. The augmented network remains structurally controllable with the
same ND = 4 but with a different MDS, now (13,S1,S2,S3). The nodes in the clusters
have all become SR as expected, and marked yellow, as checked via maximum matching.
(2) Search for all nodes with out-degree equal to three. First, each of these root
nodes has three leaves needs to be merged into clusters where possible. A V-motif
is formed if each root node points to two and only two distinct clusters, e.g., In
Supplementary Fig. 5.7a, R2 → {L1, L2, L3} is a V-motif, since L1 and L2 belongs
to the same cluster. Finally, all clusters identified should be merged where possible
before move to the next step.
(3) Repeat procedure (2) iteratively on nodes after increasing kout by one each
step. The process terminates when either no V-motifs can be found, or in the
worst case terminated on nodes with highest possible kout value. Finally, the
desired SI clusters are those clusters which contain more than one node, one of
which must be a driver node. Distinct SI clusters do not share common nodes.
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(4) Due to the complexity of the network, the first implementation of the above
procedure will not identify all possible SI clusters in the network. However, the
remaining SI clusters can by identified by eliminating the existing SI clusters from
the SI network (delete all nodes in the SI clusters along with their edges) and repeat
procedures (1)-(3) until no further V-motifs can be found. This will eventually
reveal all possible SI clusters.
The identification of KI clusters follows the same procedures except that it is
necessary to begin with the KI network which is determined by removing incoming
edges to KR nodes. A standard V-motif in the KI network is defined as one leaf
node pointed to by two KI root nodes (Supplementary Fig. S4). Similarly, KI
cluster identification follows the same procedures except searching begins with
low in-degree (kin = 2) nodes. The conditions of two clusters merge together
in sources augmentation holds for sinks augmentation as well. SI (or KI) clusters
determination is based on the degree of individual nodes in the SI (or KI) network.
Thus, the complexity is proportional to number of nodes and edges in the SI (or
KI) network. Therefore, the complexity of the algorithm is linearly proportional
to N and L in the network.
5.4.5 The properties of clusters
SI and KI clusters determination is based on the degree of individual nodes in the
SI network. Thus, the complexity is proportional to number of nodes and edges in
the SI network. Therefore, the complexity of the algorithm is linearly proportional
to N and L in the network.
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The unique features of SI (or KI) clusters are that: i) Each cluster contains only
one driver (or terminal) node. ii) The number of clusters is exactly the number
of sources (or sinks) that can be added to the network in one time-step without
increasing ND. If there are k clusters, it is possible to augment the network with
k source nodes in parallel. iii) Once a source node is connected to any node in an
SI cluster, all nodes in the cluster become SR and they can be ignored from this
point in the augmentation process. Similar concept applies to connecting a sink
node to any nodes in a KI cluster. In this case, all nodes in the cluster become KR
and they can be ignored from this point in the augmentation process. iv) A newly
connected source (or sink) node replaces the driver (or terminal) node in a cluster,
and thereby result in the network having a new MDS (or MTS). Figure 5.9b shows
that when source nodes (S1, S2, S3) are connected to the three different clusters,
all nodes in the clusters change to SR but ND = 4 remains unchanged, which
verifies the properties of clusters. Since all nodes apart from the drivers have
become source nodes, from this point no new augmentation is possible.
5.5 Maximum Augmentable Nodes
Given a network G(A), define NMAS and NMAK as the maximal number of new
source and sink nodes that can be augmented to the network without increasing
ND respectively. These numbers can serve as a reference frame to compare how
successful our method of effective augmentation performs. Of course, here only
the non-trivial augmentation is considered. It is possible to prove the simple but
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Figure 5.10: Effective sink augmentation of a small network. (a) A directed
network with eighteen nodes contains MTS={2,9,15,17} which is determined by max-
imum matching. (b) By applying our cluster identification algorithm, two KI clusters
are identified: {15,3,5} and {9,6}. (c) To verify the features of clusters, two indepen-
dent sink nodes are augmented to each cluster, 6→ K1, 3→ K2. By classifying nodes
in this new network, every node in the cluster become KR and the newly connected
nodes K1, K2 become new terminal nodes while the total number of terminal nodes
remain four. (d) The augmented network is still structurally controllable with the same
MDS as shown in Fig.5.5.
elegant relationships:
NMAS = ND −NS (5.2a)
NMAK = ND −NK (5.2b)
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where NS and NK are the number of source nodes and sink nodes that exist in the
network respectively and ND is the minimal number of drivers required to control
the system and depends on the network topology.
The intuition here is as follows. It is important to know that the network requires
a minimum of ND drivers to be fully controlled. Each of the NS existing source
nodes in the network need to be controlled and thus each requires a dedicated
driver. In addition, each of the AS augmented source nodes added to the network
will itself become a driver. A simple but important relationship ND = AS +NS is
arrived, which yields equation (5.2).
Following the finding of Ruths et al [36], it is fair to deduce that AS is equivalent
to the number of dilation in network. A dilation occurs when a stem branches
into two or more paths. In practice, since a new source node augmented to the
network is destined to become a driver, then to compensate this some other existing
driver of the network can no longer continue to function as a driver if ND is to be
maintained. A similar relationship is found for the maximal number of sink nodes
that can be augmented as number of dilation in G(AT ), where AT is transpose
of matrix A. As an example, Fig. 5.1 shows a network with ND = 11 drivers,
NS = 3 source nodes and NK = 2 sink nodes. According to equation (5.2),
the network can be augmented up to a maximum of AS = 8 source nodes and
AK = 2 sink nodes to the network without increasing ND. For a network, ND can
be calculated using the minimum input theorem, while, NS, NK can be derived
easily with NS = NPin(0) and NK = NPout(0) where N is total number of nodes,
Pin(k), Pout(k) are the in-degree and out-degree distribution respectively. It has
been proved [35] that number of minimum driver nodes of most large directed real
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networks can be expressed as:
ND = max{N − rank(A), 1} (5.3)
Equation (5.3) helps to approximate AS and AD in large real networks or sparse
model networks. The formula also shows that ND may be large in number for
small rank matrices A.
5.6 Effective Augmentation in Synthetic Networks
The importance of clusters in network augmentation has been demonstrated. As
the minimum number of new source (or sink) nodes that can be augmented by
effective augmentation method depends on the numbers of SI (or KI) clusters
existing in the network, there is a need to explore the latter empirically. Denote
the number of SI clusters in a network as NSIC and the number of KI clusters as
NKIC .
5.6.1 Effective augmentation in Scale-Free networks
First of all, scale-free networks [17, 107] of different average degree but having i-
dentical input and output degree exponents (γin = γout = 3) are studied. Without
loss of generality, networks are considered with no disconnected nodes. For the
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purposes of exploring the cluster distributions over different network sizes, the pa-
rameters are normalised based on the network’s total number of nodes, N, respec-
tively, i.e., (nSIC , nKIC , nD,nMAS, nMAK) = (NSIC , NKIC , ND, NMAS, NMAK)/N .
Figure 5.11a demonstrates that nSIC (blue dots) and nKIC (red squares) follow
the same trend: both decrease as the mean degree of the network increases. For
networks with low average degree, e.g., 〈k〉 = 4 the minimum fraction of new n-
odes that can be augmented in parallel is approximately 9% of the total number
of nodes (nSIC = 9%). For networks with high mean degree, augmentation is
limited independent of the method. For example, in a fully connected network
with ND = 1, only one new source node can be augmented and nSIC = 0 since no
V-motifs exist.
To investigate the capability of the method in capturing augmenting solutions, the
number of clusters NSIC(blue dots) and NMAS (yellow triangles; the upper limit
of augmentation) are plotted as a function of average degree 〈k〉 in Fig 5.11b. At
〈k〉 = 4, approximate 65% (NSIC/NMAS) of the total possible source nodes NMAS
can be augmented simultaneously via our cluster based method. Again, the higher
the mean degree of the network, the less the number of new nodes that can be
augmented non-trivially.
Generating Scale-Free networks
The scale-free networks analysed are generated via the static model as follows [108,
109]. First, start from N disconnected nodes indexed by the integers i (i =
1, 2, · · · , N). Each node i has an out- and an in-weight wout,ini = i−αout,in , where
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Figure 5.11: Effective augmentation of scale-Free networks. Distribution of
the minimum fraction of new source nodes (nSIC) and sink nodes (nKIC) that can be
effectively augmented in scale-free networks (identical degree exponents γin = γout = 3).
(a) nSIC and nKIC versus 〈k〉 are shown in blue dots and red squares respectively.
These networks have a power law degree distribution. Insert figure shows the degree
distribution of the network with 〈k〉= 6. The solid line shows the curve fitting of the
presented data using non-linear polynomial fitting functions. (b)nSIC = NSIC/N and
nMAS= NMAS/N versus 〈k〉 in scale-free networks are shown in blue dots and yellow
triangles respectively, where, N is total number of nodes. nD = ND/N and s = S/N
versus 〈k〉 are shown in insert figure.
αout,in = 1/(γout,in − 1) and γout,in are exponents of the out- and in-degree distri-
butions. Then, randomly select two nodes i and j from the set of N nodes, and
connect them if they are not connected. Otherwise, select a new pair of nodes.
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The probability of an edge from i to j depends on the out-weight of node i (wouti )
and the in-weight of node j (winj ). The above process is repeated until the desired
number of links are created. Note that γout,in must be greater than or equal to 2.
(When γout =∞, Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random networks are retrieved.) The network typ-
ically has a power-law degree distribution. In the large k limit, degree distribution
is shown as a function of gamma: Pout,in(k) ∼ k−γout,in .
5.6.2 Effective augmentation in Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks
To explore nSIC and nKIC over different network types, the parameters in Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi networks [110] (Fig. 5.12) are investigated. The results shows that ER
networks are less augmentable (NSIC/NMAS ≈ 90% at 〈k〉=4) compared to SF
networks ( 65% at same 〈k〉). This is due to the fact that in general ER networks
require less driver nodes to achieve full control compared with SF networks having
identical network size and mean degree [27]. Intriguingly, in ER networks, the
decrease of nSIC and nKIC as a function of 〈k〉 are sharper compared with SF
networks. As average degree exceeds a critical value kc ≈ 8, the networks become
almost non-augmentable. This is because the maximum number of source nodes
can be augmented ,NMAS, reaches approximately zero at kc ≈ 8 (Supplementary
Fig. S5b). On the other hand, NMAS approaches zero when kc ≈ 13 in SF-
networks. Thus SF networks can be augmented within broader average degree
regions than ER networks.
Furthermore, the effective augmentation method can be applied more efficiently
in ER networks as compared to SF networks. This can be observed clearly in
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Fig. 5.12b which shows that the difference between NSIC and NMAS for ER net-
works is much smaller than their difference in SF networks (compare Figs. 5.12a
and 5.12b).
Generating Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks
Refer to Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks as graphs G(N, p), which have N nodes and the
probability that an edge is present between any pair of nodes is p where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
A graph in G(N, p) has on average
(
N
2
)
p edges. The out- and in- degree distribution
is given by Pout,in(k) = (Np)
ke−Np/k! where Np is constant. This distribution is
Poisson for large N and the mean-degree is Np = 〈kin〉 = 〈kout〉 = 〈k〉 /2.
5.7 Effective Augmentation in Real Networks
To demonstrate the feasibility of the augmentation algorithm, the tools developed
above to several real networks from a variety of different applications (Table 5.1,
5.2) are applied. Figure 5.13a shows the fraction of clusters (both SI and KI
clusters) determined from real networks versus mean degree. Overall, both nSIC
and nKIC decrease as 〈k〉 increases which is in agreement with what was found
from simulations of ER and scale-free networks. For example, networks as the
cellular, electronic circuit and power grid with relatively low average degree have
many more clusters and are thus much more augmentable than networks having
large average degree, such as social networks.
It is also important to note that some networks exhibit different proportions of
SI and KI clusters. It is clear that electronic networks can be readily augmented
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Figure 5.12: Effective augmentation of Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks. (a) nSIC and
nKIC in Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks with varying 〈k〉. The degree distribution of ER graph-
s converges to a Poisson distribution (insert). (b) nSIC and nMAS in Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
networks is demonstrated.
with sink nodes (nSIC ≈20%) but are limited with source nodes (nKIC ≈3%).
To further investigate this property, nSIC versus nKIC is plotted in Fig. 5.13b.
Also, some networks, such as cellular, food web, power grid, social networks have
approximately the same fraction of SI and KI clusters, while other networks, like
electronic circuit (more augmentable with sink nodes than source nodes) and tran-
scription networks (Yeast networks are more augmentable with source nodes than
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Type Name Description
Electronic s208 [111] Network parsed from the ISCAS89 benchmark data set
Circuits s420 [111] Same as above
s838 [111] Same as above
Food Web Everglades [112] Everglades Graminoid Marshes
Baywet [113] Florida Bay, Wet Season
Gramdry [113] Everglades Graminoids, Dry Season
Social Cons-frequency-
rev [114]
A consulting company intra-organisational network
Manuf-frequency-
rev [114]
A manufacturing company intra-organisational network
Transcription Ecoli [115] Transcriptional regulation network for E.coli
Yeast [116] Transcriptional regulation network for Yeast
ColiInterFullVec
[117]
Transcriptional regulation network of Escherichia coli
Power Grid Dallas [118] High-voltage power grid network in Dallas
Cortical Macaque corti-
cal [119]
Macaque cortical connectivity
Neuronal C. elegans-1 [120] C. elegans local network of 131 frontal neurons
C. elegans-2 [121] C. elegans global network of 277 neurons
Cellular AA [122] Cellular network of Aquifex Aeolicus
BB [122] Cellular network of Borrelia Burgdorferi
EF [122] Cellular network of Enterococcus Faecalis
PA [122] Cellular network of Pseudomonas Aeruginosa
Table 5.1: Each network shows its type, name, reference, and brief description.
sink nodes) are away from the diagonal line. This may be caused by different in-
and out- degree distributions and degree asymmetries [32, 123, 124]. Furthermore,
large numbers of SI clusters and KI clusters are found in cellular networks, power
grid and cortical networks indicating that these sorts of networks can be aug-
mented efficiently with the clustering method used in our effective augmentation.
Finally, it can be observed that networks from the same categories have similar
nSIC and nKIC , which means they have similar augmentation properties.
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Type Name N L nD nSIC nKIC
Electronic s208 122 189 0.24 3.28 19.67
Circuits s420 252 399 0.23 2.38 19.84
s838 512 819 0.23 1.95 19.92
Food Web Everglades 69 916 0.30 2.90 2.90
Baywet 128 2137 0.23 0 0
Gramdry 69 915 0.30 2.90 2.90
Social Cons-frequency-
rev
46 879 0.04 0 0
Manuf-frequency-
rev
77 2228 0.01 0 0
Transcription Ecoli 419 519 0.75 0.48 3.10
Yeast 688 1079 0.82 2.76 0.87
ColiInterFullVec 424 577 0.73 0.24 6.13
Power Grid Dallas 4941 13188 0.12 5.75 6.64
Cortical Macaque cortical 1168 2486 0.04 3.42 3.42
Neuronal C. elegans-1 131 764 0.09 0.76 0
C. elegans-2 277 2105 0.12 1.08 0.72
Cellular AA 1485 3400 0.29 10.71 9.90
BB 804 1674 0.27 8.33 7.71
EF 1407 3290 0.31 10.95 10.73
PA 2554 6080 0.32 11.51 10.14
Table 5.2: Each network lists its types, name, number of nodes (N), edges (L), fraction
of driver nodes (nD), minimum proportion of new source and sink nodes can be augmented
in parallel (nSIC and nKIC), Note that nSIC and nKIC are shown in percentage.
5.8 Summary
This chapter has for the first time proposed an effective augmentation method.
The method allows to generate a relatively large number of workable solutions in
one time-step. The number of ways of adding m new nodes to the network non-
trivially with n clusters (assume each cluster has k node) is (k−1)Cmn where m≤ n,
which is usually quite considerable. Furthermore, the solutions allows connecting
multiple source and sink nodes in parallel simultaneously without conflict, which
increases the effectiveness of the method. It might seem a limitation that the newly
connected source and sink nodes are required to be of degree one (i.e., have one
edge). However, by taking advantage of the clusters present, it is a straightforward
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Figure 5.13: Effective augmentation of real networks. (a) The fraction of
clusters versus mean degree for real networks. The left and right symbols associated
with each network type in inset figure represent nSIC and nKIC respectively. Fraction
of clusters follow decreasing trend over 〈k〉 (highlighted bands). (b) For same real
networks, nSIC versus nKIC is plotted.
extension of the method to augment new nodes having higher degree. Each new
edge can be attached to a different cluster.
Our approach is based on the presence of V-motifs in both the SI and KI network.
When the method is applied to random networks with varying average degree, the
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ability to augment a network is inversely proportional to its average degree. This
is attributed to the fact that the network clusters reduce in number as network
connectivity and average degree increase. Networks having large average degree
tend to have few clusters, and thus are hard to be augmented in practice, as was
found for social networks. For real networks, networks from the same categories
tend to have similar fractions of clusters. In summary, a successful and efficient
procedures for augmenting arbitrary directed networks while keeping the minimum
number of driver nodes required to fully control the network is formulated.
Chapter 6
Vulnerability and Augmentation
of Power Networks
6.1 Overview
Chapter III and IV have introduced a maximum flow based complex network ap-
proach to identify vulnerable components in power grids considering the penetra-
tion of renewable resources. Chapter V has introduced a new method which allows
complex networks (either synthetic networks or real networks) to be effectively
augmented without increasing total number of driver nodes but still maintaining
the full controllability of the network. In power systems, effective augmentation
method provides another angle of solving power network expansion problems.
In the following, two case studies: IEEE 118 bus and South-East Australia net-
work are utilised to verify the feasibility of vulnerability analysis and effective
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augmentation methods in enhancing the robustness and structural controllability
of a growing power network.
Section 6.2 demonstrates the application of the augmentation method in IEEE 118
bus power network. Section 6.2.1 shows the power network representative. The
step-by-step structural controllability of power grid is explained in Section 6.2.2.
Section 6.2.3 proposes an expansion solution.
In second case (Section 6.3), the SE Australia network and its complex network
representative is demonstrated in section 6.3.1. Vulnerability analysis and line
augmentation of SE Australia power network are provided in section 6.3.2. In sec-
tion 6.3.3, the effective augmentation method is applied to determine the possible
node augmentation solutions. Th recommended augmentation for SE Australia
network is explained in Section 6.3.4.
6.2 Case Study I: IEEE 118 Power Networks
6.2.1 Power grids as complex network
According to CNT, any complex network can be simplified as a set of nodes and
edges G={N,E,W}, where N is number of nodes, E is set of edges and W are
weights of edges set elements. A power system can be considered as a directed
complex network composed of nodes (generators, bus bars and loads) and links
(transmission lines).
Different from other networks, in the power system, electricity can only be gener-
ated from source nodes (generators) and delivered to sink nodes (loads) through
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Figure 6.1: The IEEE 118 bus power network
intermediate nodes (substations) and edges between nodes (transmission lines).
Thus, a power network can be modelled as a directed power network where di-
rection shows where the power flow to. According to the Kirchhoff laws, the
node-voltage method determines the power flow between any two adjacent nodes.
Fig. 6.1 shows the layout of IEEE 118 bus power network which contains 118 nodes
(19 generators 10 intermediate node and 89 loads) and 41 transmission lines.
The CN representation of the IEEE 118 network is shown in Fig. 6.2. Generators
are coloured in blue. The direction of the edges is determined by Newton Raphson
power flow method [125].
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Figure 6.2: The IEEE 118 bus complex network representative. Nodes represent
generators, substations and loads and direct links represent power flow in transmission
lines.
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Figure 6.3: The minimum number of driver nodes (coloured in blue) to achieve full
control of the network is 40
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Driver Nodes
4,6,10,14,18,25,26,27,31,32,39,48,49,50,51,58,61,64,65,66,69,70
71,79,80,81,87,89,92,93,97,99,100,102,103,108,111,114,117,118
SI Nodes
2,3,4,6,10,14,16,17,18,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,31,32,34,38,39,42,47
48,49,50,51,52,58,61,64,65,66,69,70,71,74,77,79,80,81,87,88,89
91,92,93,97,98,99,100,102,103,106,108,111,113,114,117,118
KI Nodes
1,2,3,13,16,18,19,20,28,29,31,33,35,39,40,41,42,43,47,48,52,53,
54,55,56,57,58,60,61,62,63,67,72,73,74,76,78,82,83,86,90,94,95
96,97,98,99,101,107,109,112,113,115,116,117
Table 6.1: List of driver nodes, SI nodes and KI nodes in IEEE 118 bus network
6.2.2 Structural controllability of power networks
With minimum inputs theorem, the minimum number of driver nodes of the IEEE
118 network is 40. Important to note that in most cases the solutions is not unique
but depends on the total number of possible maximum matchings. Fig. 6.3 gives
one solution where the drive nodes are coloured in blue.
The comparation between Fig. 6.3 and Fig. 6.2 shows that not all the generators
are required to be controlled to achieve full control of the network. The number
of driver nodes is depended on the network structure.
6.2.2.1 Node classification
Classifying node types is a essential step of determining node clusters. As intro-
duced in Chapter V, depends on the augmentation types (source or sink augmen-
tation), nodes in the network can be classified as SI/SR(source augmentation) or
KI/KR (sink augmentation). In this IEEE 118 bus network, there are 60 SI nodes
and 55 KI nodes (listed in Table 6.1). Important to note that all the driver nodes
are SI node which matches the expectation.
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(b) KI and KR node classification
Figure 6.4: Node classification
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SI Cluster [23,27] [28,32] [17,38,64] [113,114] [34,39] [52,58] [74,118] [88,92] [106,108]
KI Cluster [2;3] [18;20] [28;31] [39;40;42] [47;48] [52;54;56] [61;62;67] [83;94;96;97]
Table 6.2: List of SI and KI clusters in IEEE 118 bus network
New Generators New Loads
119→23 3←128
120→28 20←129
121→17 31←130
122→113 42←131
123→34 48←132
124→52 52←133
125→74 62←134
126→88 94←135
127→106
Table 6.3: List of new added 17 nodes. The arrow shows connection direction
6.2.2.2 SI and KI clusters
By applying effective augmentation algorithm, number of SI/KI nodes are grouped
together to form SI and KI clusters respectively. Table 6.2 shows the determined
clusters including 9 SI clusters and 8 KI clusters.
6.2.3 Power network expansion
The network can be expanded in a way that the minimum number of control
nodes remains the same. Effective augmentation algorithm has proved that one
SI cluster allows only one source node connection. Similarly, only one sink node
can be added to a sink cluster. An example is shown in Fig. 6.5 where 9 source
nodes and 8 sink nodes are added at one time-step. The connection detail can be
found in Table 6.3. The result shows the total number of driver nodes remaining
the same.
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Figure 6.5: Power network single connection generators and load expansion. Base
on the determined clusters shown in Table 6.2, 17 new nodes including 9 source nodes
and 8 sinks nodes are augmented to the original network. The result shows the total
number of driver nodes required to fully control the network remain the same.
6.3 Case Study II: South-East Australia Transmission Net-
work
A simplified South-East Australia network as shown in Fig.6.6 involves 59 bus-
es(include 14 generators and 28 loads). The model was originally in [126] for
disturbance stability study. The network has been divided into 5 areas which
stand for different states:
• Area1: Snowy Mountains
• Area2: New South Wales (NSW)
• Area3: Victoria (VIC)
• Area4: Queensland (QLD)
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Figure 6.6: The simplified 14-generator model of the SE Australian power system
• Area5: South Australia (SA)
Areas 1 and 2 are closely coupled. To share power among different areas, different
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states are inter-connected via HV transmission line. In the power system power is
transmitted in four different voltage levels: 220kV, 275kV, 330kV and 500kV. The
voltages change rely on step-up or step-down transformers located in substations.
More information can be found in Table 6.4.
6.3.1 Power system complex network model
As mentioned in earlier chapters, power system networks can be simplified or
modelled as a set, G={N,E,W}, where N is number of nodes, E is the sets of
edges and W represents the weights of edge set elements. In this case, nodes are
generators, substations and loads, edges represent transmission lines in different
voltage levels and weights of lines are transmission capacities which are mainly
determined by the type of cable, cable size and weather factors like, ambient
temperature, wind speed, wind directions and so on.
In power network, generators are considered as source nodes and loads are noted
as sink nodes. Figure 6.7 shows the SE power grid CN representative, in which
source and sink nodes are coloured in blue and green respectively.
Table 6.4: SE Australian power system
Bus Type Bus Number
Generators 101, 201,202,203,204,301,302,401,402,403,404,501,502,503
220kV Bus 312,313,314
275kV Bus 315,405,406,407,408,409,410,411,412,413,504,505,506,507,508,509
330kV Bus 102, 205,206,207,208,209,211,212,214,215,216,217,309,310,311,414,415,416
500kV Bus 210,213,303,304,305,306,307,308
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6.3.2 Vulnerability of SE Australia power network
6.3.2.1 Maximum power flow
In power networks, power can only be transmitted from generators to loads via
network. The transmission paths are not necessary the shortest. Maximum power
flow from a generator node u to a load node v via the power network (Pmaxuv ) is
limited by following factors:
• Generator capacity (PGmaxu ): maximum power can be produced by a gener-
ator u
• Maximum demand (PLmaxv ): maximum power demand from a load v
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Figure 6.7: SE Australian power complex network after augmentation
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• Network topology and line capacity (Lmaxuv ): maximum allowable power from
generator u to load v which pass through multiple directly or indirectly con-
nected edges. The line capacity can be determined from Eq. 3.5.
Thus, Pmaxuv can be represented as :
Pmaxuv = min{PGmaxu , PLmaxv , Lmaxuv } u 6= v (6.1)
where Lmaxuv can be determined via Ford-Fulkerson algorithm (Algorithm 1) which
is applied in this thesis.
6.3.2.2 Line vulnerability
For the SE power network with m(m = 14) source nodes and n(n = 28) sink nodes,
let Pmaxuv be the maximum real power flow from source u to sink v and P
max
uv (i, j) be
the portion of flow through the edge Eij. Thus, the average real power centrality
index CRealij of edge Eij can be defined as the real power centrality index divided
by the maximum real power flow viz.:
Cij =
m∑
u=1
n∑
v=1
Pmaxuv (i, j)
m∑
u=1
n∑
v=1
Pmaxuv
(6.2)
Figure 6.8 illustrates the line vulnerability of SE power network and the list of line
number can be found in Table 6.5. It is clear that most of lines have line centrality
less than 0.1 which means they are not playing significant role in transferring
power from generators to loads as expressed in Eq. 6.2. This may be caused by
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Figure 6.8: Line Vulnerability of SE Australian network
the topology of the network including line capacities and locations of the major
generators. On the other hand, minority of lines (i.e., 2, 3, 4) carry most power
flow.
6.3.2.3 Line augmentation of SE power network
The above analysis shows that line L2, L3, L3, L7, L36, L41, L42 have centrality index
more than 0.2. Tripping of any of these lines could redistribute a huge amount of
power to its adjacent lines which may lead to more line drop off due to overloading
and eventually result in a cascading failure. Thus, It is important to maintain the
line vulnerability under certain level to reduce the risk of cascading failure.
Base on equation 6.2, to reduce the centrality Cij, total flow P
max
uv (i, j) through
the line Lij from any generator u to any load v need to be minimised. The
further analysis has found that Pmaxuv (i, j) is dominated when u = 203 and v =
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Table 6.5: List of lines in SE Australian power system
Line
Number
Line
Line
Number
Line
Line
Number
Line
Line
Number
Line
1 101-102 21 212-217 41 309-310 61 413-414
2 217-102 22 213-214 42 310-311 62 414-415
3 102-309 23 214-216 43 312-313 63 415-416
4 201-206 24 214-217 44 314-313 64 501-504
5 202-209 25 215-216 45 315-509 65 502-505
6 203-208 26 215-217 46 401-410 66 503-506
7 204-215 27 216-217 47 402-408 67 504-507
8 205-206 28 301-303 48 403-407 68 504-508
9 416-205 29 302-312 49 404-405 69 505-507
10 206-207 30 303-304 50 405-409 70 505-508
11 206-212 31 303-305 51 406-405 71 506-507
12 206-215 32 304-305 52 408-405 72 506-508
13 207-208 33 304-313 53 407-406 73 507-508
14 209-207 34 305-306 54 407-408 74 507-509
15 208-211 35 305-307 55 408-410 75
16 209-210 36 311-305 56 409-411 76
17 209-212 37 305-314 57 410-411 77
18 210-213 38 306-307 58 410-412 78
19 212-211 39 307-308 59 410-413 79
20 214-211 40 308-315 60 411-412 80
306, 307, 308, 309, 313, 314. The flow is from area 2 to area 3 through the only
inter-connector between the two areas (217-102).
To enhance the robustness of the network, additional link from 217 to 305 has been
added to network. Figure 6.9 shows the line vulnerability after augmentation. It
is clear that the new line migrates some of the flow from the highly strengthen
lines. Figure 6.10 demonstrates the line vulnerability after connecting another line
between 217 and 309. These two more interconnection between two areas have
significantly reduce the vulnerability of the system as all line centrality less than
0.2.
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Figure 6.9: Line Vulnerability of SE Australian network with one additional line
(217-305) added
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Figure 6.10: Line Vulnerability of SE Australian network with two additional line
(217-305, 207-309) added
6.3.3 Structural Controllability of SE power network
Controllability of a power system is vital of maintaining the stability of the net-
work. During fault full control over the network could potentially drive the system
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from any undesired initial state (i.e., voltage collapse, supply demand mismatch)
to any desired final state to minimise the loss.
It has been proven that a physical system is controllable if the system is struc-
turally controllable. The main benefit of the structural controllability is that it
solves the computable problems of the network controllability.
6.3.3.1 Minimum drive nodes
According to the minimum input theorem, the structural controllability problem
can be translated into the maximum matching in its corresponding digraph. The
minimum number of driver nodes (Nd) can be determined as follow:
Nd = max{N − |M∗|, 1} (6.3)
where M* is the number of matched nodes, and N is the total number of nodes.
Thus, SE power network required minimum 16 driver nodes to achieve full control
of the network.
Figure 6.11 shows one of the driving solutions. The driver nodes are coloured
in blue. Important to note that all the generators in the system are driver node
which matches with our preconception.
6.3.3.2 Nodes augmentation of SE power network
To apply the effective augmentation method, a complex network representation
model is essential. Figure 6.11 shows the represented complex network which
Vulnerability and Augmentation of Power Networks 138
includes 59 nodes and 74 edges. To achieve full control of the network, 16 nodes
(coloured in blue in Fig. 6.11) need to be controlled. Important to note that
all the generators in the system are single edge source nodes which must be fully
controlled. By applying effective augmentation method, the SI and KI clusters of
the network as shown in Table 6.6 can be determined.
After investigation, seven clusters are determined (one SI cluster and six KI clus-
ter) and most of the clusters are located in NSW (area 2). Base on the theory
explained in the Chapter V, NSW allows to have four new load buses and one new
generators without losing the full controllability of the network. Meanwhile, SA
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Figure 6.11: The simplified 14-generator model of the SE Australian power system.
Driver nodes are coloured in blue
Table 6.6: List of SI and KI cluster in SE Australian Network
SI Cluster [207,210,212]
KI Cluster [101,217][201,205][203,207][214,215][401,408][315,507]
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Figure 6.12: SE Australian power complex network after augmentation
and QLD are capable of expanding the network with additional one sink node. In
VIC state, any expansion will result in increasing of minimum number of driver
nodes. Figure 6.12 shows the controllability of the SE Australia network after
adding seven new nodes to the clusters (the new connections are coloured in red).
The result shows that the number of driver nodes remains the same which again
proves the feasibility of the method. Compare with the commonly used augmen-
tation methods which mainly focus on minimizing cost and increasing network
efficiency but neglect the importance of maintaining the system’s full controllabil-
ity, the proposed effective augmentation provides a different angle of expending a
power network while maintains the full controllability of the network with minimal
drive nodes.
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Figure 6.13: Line Vulnerability of SE Australian network after nodes and lines aug-
mentation
6.3.4 Augmented SE networks
For the sake of network stability, reliability and safety, power networks require
expansion over time. Line expansions could potentially reduce strength of the
system and enhance system robustness. Nodes expansion (adding new nodes) on
the other hand is required for providing new connections to power networks, like
new generators and loads. Due to the limited power transfer capacity of lines,
nodes and lines expansion may be required at same time.
Above analysis has shown that SE network can be significantly enhanced by con-
necting additional interconnections between areas 2 and 3. The additional trans-
mission line could relief the power flow congestion considerably between the two
areas. The proposed connections are 217-305 and 207-309 which reflect to physical
links in areas Wagga Wagga - Melbourne and Wallerawang - Albury respectively.
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Also, to maintain the structural controllability of the network, the new nodes can
only be connected to specified location. Figure 6.13 investigates the vulnerability
of the network after the nodes and lines augmentation. It is clear that the new
augmented network has significant improvement of vulnerability level and mean-
while the minimum number of driver nodes remains unchanged. The commonly
applied methods which can be categorized as random augmentation (from struc-
tural controllability point of view) on other hand require additional driver nodes
to remain the network fully controlled.
6.4 Summary
This chapter has investigated the feasibility of applying proposed vulnerability
and augmentation methods in two different power networks: IEEE 118 bus and
South-East Australia network. The first case study has proved that IEEE 118
bus network can be expanded by following effective augmentation algorithm such
that the total number of driver nodes remains the same. Another case study
has shown that system’s robustness can be enhanced by connecting additional
lines to the existing network. The section has demonstrated the feasibility of the
proposed methods in assisting power network expansion by strengthening network
performance and maintaining controllability with minimum driver nodes.
Chapter 7
Conclusions and Further Research
7.1 Overview
This chapter draws a conclusion of the dissertation including the summary of
the research findings and potential future works. Section 7.2 proposes an overall
conclusion and outlines of the main findings of the thesis. Section 7.3 provides
some future study directions.
7.2 Research Summary
Complex network theory has proven effective application in solving large-scale
practical problems in many different fields. The thesis has demonstrated two
major applications in power systems. The first achievement was identifying vul-
nerable components in power systems considering the effect of reactive power flow
and intermittent and unpredictable characteristics of renewable generations on
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power system vulnerability. Therefore, protection and monitoring of the compo-
nents could potentially prevent the systems from cascading failure. The second
application that has investigated in this thesis was augmenting a complex network
and no additional driver nodes are required to accommodate the the changes. The
feasibility of the vulnerability analysis and network augmentation has been tested
on two real networks: IEEE 118 bus and South-East Australia networks.
The main results and contributions of this thesis can be summarised below:
1. Both real and reactive power flow are important in preventing the system from
cascading failure either through supply-demand mismatch or voltage collapse.
(a) A maximum flow model is studied to determine the maximum possible power
flow from generators to loads.
(b) A maximum flow based centrality index is proposed which is derived by con-
sidering the power system as two complex networks, a real power flow CN and
a reactive power flow CN. Each CN has its own power system features and con-
straints.
(c) A fuzzy logic method is developed to combine two centrality indices which are
identified to assess the vulnerability within its own CN to produce the composite
centrality index for the power system.
2. The erratic nature of volatile renewable sources introduce fluctuation in the
power production and could potentially switch the direction of power flow as well
as affect the network robustness. Especially for some of the networks which heavily
rely on volatile renewable energy source, low or zero wind generations at peak
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demands could significantly increase the burden of the network which in turn
increases the incidence of cascading failure.
(a) The extended model is improved so that time varying load variability, non-
dispatchable wind generation are considered.
(b) A power dispatch and load shedding algorithm is designed for cascading failure
analysis;
(c) A cascading failure simulator is constructed to test the performance of the
proposed method.
(d) Three case studies are demonstrated to verify the proposed method in different
conditions.
3. While modern networks constantly change in size, few studies have sought
methods for the difficult task of optimising this growth. An effective augmentation
algorithm is designed which takes advantage of clusters intrinsic to the network
topology, and permits rapidly and efficient augmentation of a large number of
nodes in one time-step.
(a) An cluster method is proposed which allows to generate a relatively large
number of workable solutions in one time-step.
(b) Apply the method to random networks with varying average degree, the ability
to augment a network is inversely proportional to its average degree. This is
attributed to the fact that the network clusters reduce in number as network
connectivity and average degree increase. Networks having large average degree
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tend to have few clusters, and thus are hard to be augmented in practice, as was
found for social networks.
(c) Apply the method to real networks from a variety of different applications.
The results show that networks from the same categories tend to have similar
fractions of clusters.
4. Vulnerability and augmentation of SE Australia power prove the feasibility of
proposed methodologies in assisting power system expansion planning.
(a)IEEE 118 bus power network was modelled to verify the feasibility of the
effective augmentation method.
(b) South-East Australia power system model was developed. Appling vulnera-
bility analysis to SE Australia network, the results show that line augmentation
could potentially enhance the network robustness.
(c) Effective augmentation method is feasible of providing optimal node augmen-
tation solutions without requiring additional driver nodes to accommodate the
change.
7.3 Future Research
Following the study into power system vulnerability and controllability with com-
plex network theory, there are many aspects to the problems of determining weak
components in power systems and efficiently augmenting complex networks that
could be investigated further. A few possible research directions are listed below:
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Charging of Electric Vehicles and Penetration of Renewable Generators
As moving to low-emission future, an increasing number of renewable generators
(i.e., wind farms, solar farms etc) are being built and huge quantities of ”green
cars” (mainly electric cars) come into use. The intermittent and unpredictable
characteristics of renewable energy generation along with unpredicted power de-
mands from electric vehicles could potentially lead to demand supply mismatch
and therefore affecting the power vulnerability characteristics. Thus, a dynamic
vulnerability assessment associated with intelligent control to reduce the vulnera-
bility level would be a possible research direction.
Cyber attack and Interdependent Network
With the increasing integration of real-time monitoring, sensing, communication,
and control, electric power systems are becoming increasingly efficient, complex,
observable and controllable. However, the complex integration also makes the sys-
tem more vulnerable to cyber attack which includes fault information injection
attack, attack on system generator dynamics, system topology, energy market etc.
Furthermore, physical power transmission network is closely coupled with commu-
nication network. In the interdependent network, a failure in one network could
potentially pass to another and therefore increase the risk of cascading failure.
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Optimisation of Network Expansion
The augmentation method developed in the thesis is targeted on adding new nodes
to an existing directed network. However, there is significant room for improve-
ment. For example, as power systems getting more complicated with the intercon-
nection between distributed generation (DG) and distribution network, power flow
direction may vary depends on the generation of DGs. In this case, a augmentation
method which is capable of processing un-directed network is necessary.
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